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JPRS-SEA-85-088

4 June 1985



# Southeast Asia Report

VIETNAM

TAP CHI CONG SAN

No. 3, March 1985

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4 June 1985

## SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

### VIETNAM

TAP CHI CONG SAN

No. 3, March 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Communist Party published in Hanoi.

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## THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY IS 30 YEARS OLD

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 1-5

[Editorial]

[Text] On 22 March 1985, the people of the Lao ethnic groups celebrate a major political event: the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Together with progressive mankind throughout the world, the communists, working class and people of Vietnam share the joy and pride of the communists, working class and people of the fraternal Lao ethnic minorities.

In the 1930's, under the yoke of domination of the French imperialists and feudal rulers, the Indochinese Communist Party was born, thereby marking a fundamental turning point in the revolutionary history of all three countries on the Indochina peninsula. The 1930 political platform of the party charted the course for the revolution of each country. The line on how to perform the strategic tasks of the Lao revolution was adopted on the basis of this platform. Under the banner of the party, the Lao revolution, along with the revolutions of Vietnam and Cambodia, entered a new period. Uniting closely, the people of the Lao minorities arose in continuous, widespread struggle, advanced to victory after victory, seized political power from the French colonialists and Japanese fascists and formally declared the independence of Laos on 12 October 1945. Then, under the leadership of the party, the people of Laos together with the fraternal peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia waged a sacred war of resistance against the French colonialist aggressors, dealt them heavy defeats on all three battlefields and forced them to recognize the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, to recognize the legitimacy of the revolutionary forces of Laos.

On 22 March 1955, after the U.S. imperialists jumped into Indochina, in the face of the requirements of the situation and as a result of the growth of the Lao revolution, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party was born. The product of the combination of the patriotic movement among the Lao minorities and Marxism-Leninism, which was brought to Indochina by President Ho Chi Minh, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party "carried on the glorious cause of the Indochinese Communist Party and undertook the sacred mission of being the sole leader of the Lao revolution in the most difficult stage in the nation's history."(1)

The past 30 years have been a period of great glory for the Lao People's Revolutionary Party.

As regards its leadership of the national, democratic revolution, the party, as soon as it was born, undertook the historic mission of leading the struggle of the Lao people against the United States for national salvation. Under the glorious banner of the party, the people of the Lao minorities entered a new period of struggle, a period that was filled with challenges and hardships but which also was a brilliant period marked by large victories, and wrote some of the most beautiful chapters in the history of the Lao tribes. Coordinating in the fight with the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia, the armed forces and people of Laos recorded brilliant feats of arms. The victories won in the Plaine des Jarres-Xieng Khouang region (in the spring of 1961 and during the 1969-1970 dry season), at Nam Tha (May, 1962), at Nam Bac (January, 1968) and so forth, especially the victory that crushed the invasion of southern Laos by the U.S. imperialists and the Saigon puppet government in operation "Lam Son 719" (February 1971) stand as immortal epics in the nation's history. The liberated zone was steadily expanded, was staunchly defended, was built and strengthened in every way. In 1975, under the leadership of the party, the people of the Lao minorities arose as one in a general offensive, drove off the U.S. interventionists and aggressors, toppled their lackeys, the radical rightist reactionaries, and seized political power nationwide. On 2 December 1975, the national congress, representing the solid unity among the Lao minorities and their desire to be the masters of their country, formally declared the end of U.S. neo-colonialism and the outmoded feudal system and the founding of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, thereby ushering in the most brilliant era in the Lao minorities' several thousand year history of building and defending the country: the era of independence and freedom, of the advance to socialism, of building a life of prosperity and happiness. In the course of leading the anti-imperialist national, democratic revolution, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party firmly adhered to the view concerning the need to employ violent revolutionary force and based the stages, targets and methods of the struggle on the specific comparison of forces between the revolution and counter-revolution at home and in the world during each period. The party skillfully combined military and political struggle with legal and diplomatic struggle. It knew how to create and seize opportunities. It correctly and creatively applied an offensive revolutionary strategy, a strategy of waging the struggle while building and developing its forces, of fighting while negotiating, of attacking the enemy while thwarting their efforts in order to gradually defeat the enemy, win small victories and eventually win total victory.

In its leadership of the socialist revolution, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, upon the completion of the national democratic revolution, adopted the policy of advancing Laos directly to socialism without experiencing the stage of capitalist development. On the basis of the fundamental characteristic of the Lao revolution as a revolution that is "advancing from small-scale production in a largely natural economy directly to socialism," the party established the general line and tasks in the period of transition to socialism in Laos as the following: "Fully maintaining and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat; implementing and upholding the right of collective ownership of the working people; simultaneously carrying out the

three revolutions, the production relations revolution, the scientific-technological revolution and ideological and cultural revolution, the key one being the scientific-technological revolution, and developing the ideological and cultural revolution one step ahead of the other two revolutions; reorganizing production and using the development of agriculture and forestry as the base for the development of industry; gradually building a system of large-scale, socialist production; promoting socialist industrialization, considering it to be the central task throughout the period of transition to socialism; establishing the system of socialist collective ownership, developing the new culture and molding the new, socialist man."

In nearly 10 years, under the leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, the people of the Lao minorities, displaying constant diligence and creativity in their work, displaying bravery in combat, making every effort to build socialism and determined to defend their socialist fatherland, have won important victories in every field.

Through the increasingly large gains being made, the restoration and development of the economy are profoundly changing the face of this poor and backward country. The 1978-1980 Three Year Plan was completed in splendid fashion. Under it, both the gross social product and per capita income rose rapidly. The first 5-year plan (1981-1985) holds many fine prospects. Within agriculture, cooperativization is developing well. Thousands of agricultural cooperatives have been established in all regions of the country, cooperatives that are now making every effort to apply new farming techniques, apply scientific and technological advances in an effort to achieve high yields. Whereas it once had to import grain each year, Laos is now virtually self-sufficient in grain. In 1984, despite severe drought, Laos still managed to record a major victory in agriculture, harvesting 1.3 million tons of paddy.

The industry of Laos is also on a strong momentum of change. Hundreds of factories and enterprises have been restored or constructed. The power sector has developed strongly. The Nam Ngum hydroelectric power network now has a capacity of 150,000 kilowatt hours and provides the electricity needed for production and domestic consumption. Since 1982, Laos has been exporting some of its electric power.

On the cultural and social front, in addition to its foremost achievement of wiping out illiteracy nationwide, the education system and public health network of Laos are also being expanded. Nearly 7,000 general schools with an enrollment of more than 600,000 students on all levels are being operated during the 1984-1985 school year. Prior to the 1945 revolution, there were only four college graduates in all of Laos. Today, more than 5,000 persons have a college or post-graduate education. Many new hospitals have been constructed. Practically all villages have a public health station. More than 100,000 public health cadres on the various levels are working night and day to provide the people with health care.

In the field of foreign affairs, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party has made important contributions to strengthening the solidarity of the three countries of Indochina. Considering the long-standing and comprehensive militant alliance between the Lao revolution and the revolutions of fraternal Vietnam

and Cambodia to be a special relationship, a law in the development of the revolution of each country, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party has constantly worked to strengthen the solidarity it shares with the revolutionary forces of Vietnam and Cambodia. At the same time, it has attached very much importance to international solidarity, to seeking international sympathy, support and assistance, most importantly from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the other fraternal socialist countries, thereby coordinating the Lao revolution with the three revolutionary currents in the world. Under the party's peaceful foreign policy, the Lao People's Democratic Republic has made major contributions to the common struggle to make Southeast Asia a region of peace, stability and cooperation, oppose the arms race launched by the U.S. imperialists, relax international tensions and promote peace, national independence, democracy and social progress. The international status and prestige of the Lao People's Democratic Republic have been steadily rising.

Coming at a time when the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and other reactionary powers, including the ultra-rightist Thai reactionaries, are vigorously pursuing a hostile policy and waging a most insidious wide-ranging war of sabotage against Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in a vain attempt to shatter the alliance among the peoples of our three fraternal countries and are engaged in plots to weaken, annex and enslave each country, the above mentioned achievements recorded by the people of Laos under the glorious banner of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party assume even greater significance.

The victories won by the Lao revolution during the past 30 years stand as eloquent testimony to the leadership role and skill of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Having been born and grown up in a colonial, semi-feudal country, a country whose working class is not large, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, which has Marxism-Leninism as its ideological foundation and the compass guiding it in each of its activities, has creatively applied the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of Laos, constantly learned from its nation's experience in revolutionary struggle and applied the experiences of fraternal parties well. The party set a correct line for both the national, democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, accurately defined its strategic and tactical tasks, clearly defined who the targets of the revolution and who the moving forces behind the revolution are and adopted suitable revolutionary methods. By closely combining the cause of national independence and the cause of socialism, the party established a solid alliance between workers and peasants, built a united national front on the basis of this alliance, tapped the strength of the unity of all the people and combined this strength with the strength stemming from the unity of the three nations of Indochina and the strength of the three revolutionary currents in the world, thereby achieving the invincible combined strength of the Lao revolution.

In the process of leading the revolution, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party has been constantly strengthened politically, ideologically and organizationally, gained increasing prestige among the people and proven itself worthy of being the loyal representatives of the interests of the working class and ethnic minorities of Laos, of being the dependable Marxist-

Leninist vanguard unit, the leader and organizer of each victory of the Lao revolution.

The communists and people of Vietnam are always following, with deep admiration and affection, the victories being won by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, by the people of the fraternal Lao minorities under the leadership of their party. We sincerely thank the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and the people of the fraternal Lao minorities for the valuable support and assistance they have given to our party and people. As the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam confirmed, this closeness, love and mutual assistance, this unity in times of joy as well as adversity are becoming increasingly evident in the life and sentiments of the people of each country on the Indochina peninsula. And, every feat of arms in the defense of the fatherland, every achievement in socialist construction by our people is closely tied to the valuable assistance provided by the fraternal people of Laos as well as the fraternal people of Cambodia.

The communist party of Vietnam has always considered the special relationship that exists among Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to be a law in the development of the revolutions of these three countries, to be a matter of survival to our three nations. Our party has pointed out: "From one generation to the next, our people must preserve the pure feeling of friendship and the tradition of solidarity among our three nations, must constantly strengthen and improve the special relations and the militant alliance among our three countries, must be determined to defeat each scheme and act of sabotage, division and aggression by our common enemy, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists and other reactionary powers. We consider this to be a firm guarantee of success in the cause of safeguarding independence and freedom and building socialism within each country on the Indochina peninsula; at the same time, it is an extremely important factor of peace and stability in Southeast Asia."(2)

We are exceedingly happy to see that under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, the special friendship and comprehensive cooperation between Vietnam and Laos, which have been challenged and tempered in the various stages of the revolutions of our two countries, are being strengthened and developed, in a way that reflects a new quality, more with each day that passes. The Vietnam-Laos Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that was signed in 1977 in Vientiane, the High-Level Conference of the Three Countries of Indochina held in early 1983 and the recent resolutions of our two parties concerning the relations between Vietnam and Laos are of very important historic significance and mark a new stage of development of the militant alliance and the special relations between Vietnam and Laos.

On this the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party the communists and people of Vietnam sincerely extend our deepest congratulations and convey our warmest affections to the communists and people of the fraternal Lao minorities.

At present, under the leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, all the people of Laos are redoubling their efforts to strengthen their unity and



heighten their spirit of vigilance in the face of the schemes and tactics of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and the imperialists and prepare themselves to defeat each of their schemes while making every effort to develop the economy, develop production, stabilize the living conditions of the people and accelerate their socialist transformation and socialist construction, beginning by implementing the resolution of the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and successfully completing the first 5-year state plan.

The reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists and other reactionaries powers, are greatly angered by the independent and autonomous line of Laos. They are making intense efforts to sabotage the peaceful labor of the people of Laos, are plotting ways to bring about peaceful change, to foment insurrection and topple the government and are eager to invade Laos. However, they have been and are being defeated by the heroic and indomitable people of the Lao minorities. We are confident that, under the glorious banner of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party headed by the esteemed General Secretary Kayson Phomvihan, the people of the fraternal Lao minorities will surely successfully complete each of their tasks, successfully build socialism and firmly defend their beloved fatherland, thereby bringing increasing prosperity to Laos and increasing happiness to its people and making worthy contributions to the cause of revolution in Indochina and throughout the world.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Kayson Phomvihan: "A Few Experiences of Major Importance and Some Matters Concerning the New Guidelines of the Lao Revolution," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1979, p 141.
2. The Proceedings of the 5th Congress, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1982, Volume I, p 147.

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## HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 6-18

[Concluding speeches by Le Duan at 1974 and 1975 Political Bureau Conferences]

[Text] Editorial Note: in late 1974 and early 1975, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee met to discuss the resistance against the United States for national salvation during the 2 years 1975 and 1976. The conference was held in two rounds. Round I was held from 30 September 1974 to 8 October 1974. The conference was then temporarily suspended to await the arrival of leaders from the battlefield in the South. Round II began at the start of 1975 and lasted until 7 January 1975, at which time the conference concluded. General Secretary Le Duan delivered two concluding speeches at the two rounds of the Political Bureau Conference. In these two speeches, Le Duan laid out the tasks and plan for advancing our people's resistance against the United States for national salvation to total victory. The correct and clear-sighted leadership of the party expressed in the two concluding speeches delivered by General Secretary Le Duan was the factor of foremost importance in the victory of the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975 that brought about the complete liberation of the South and reunified the country. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of our victory in the resistance against the United States for national salvation, we are publishing the complete text of these two very important documents in order to give our readers an opportunity to study them.

The Speech Concluding Round I of the Political Bureau Conference (from 30 September to 8 October 1974)

Following more than 1 week of working, our Political Bureau has unanimously decided to complete the people's national, democratic revolution in the South. This is an extremely important decision, one that will eventually lead to the conclusion of the long revolutionary war that we have been fighting for more than 30 years, have been fighting ever since we won political power, and to the fulfillment of our glorious responsibility to the nation and our large international obligation to the times in which we live. This is a very courageous, even bold, decision. However, this decision that we have made is the product of the collective intelligence of the Political Bureau, is the result of thinking that has been developed over a period of many years, of sound deliberation based on the experiences that have been gained over the

past several decades of fighting, on the realities of the revolution as they exist on the battlefield and on the comparison of forces within our country and in the world.

Why, in 1954, did the United States jump into South Vietnam and start the "special war," which subsequently developed into the "limited war," and why must it now withdraw its forces?

Following World War II, the United States did not dare send in forces to stop the Chinese revolution. However, in the Korean War, the United States jumped in and saved the lackey South Korean regime from collapse. With that, the United States learned that it could use its might to stop the spread of communism and hold onto its remaining positions without much difficulty. While we were winning victory over France, the United States intervened in the Indochina war. At the Geneva Conference on Indochina, because they knew that China feared U.S. power, the United States and France reached agreement with China to pressure us into stopping following the victory of Dien Bien Phu. After containing the victories of the Vietnamese revolution to some extent, the United States jumped into South Vietnam in a vain attempt to prevent communism from sweeping into Southeast Asia. The foremost concern of the United States was to crush uprisings and defeat wars of national liberation. It maintained that the best available option was to use lackey armies plus U.S. weapons and equipment. Participation by the United States would be limited to the use of military advisors or, at the very most, a few divisions of expeditionary troops. The United States calculated that it could simultaneously wage several such wars by this method and still win victory without employing their strategic forces, which were being reserved for confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In South Vietnam, the United States installed the lackey Ngo Dinh Diem government and undermined the Geneva Accords in a vain attempt to permanently divide our country. The United States and Diem dispatched whole brigades and divisions to carry out sweep operations and shelling attacks and drag guillotines throughout the South to terrorize and kill. It came as a major surprise to the United States and Diem that we were able to mobilize the masses to arise and briefly seize control of several large rural areas. We won victory during this stage because we recognized our fundamental strengths and the enemy's fundamental weaknesses at a time when they were aggressively pursuing the most fascist of tactics.

In 1962, with the lackey clique facing a difficult situation, the Kennedy administration hastily set up the U.S. military command in South Vietnam (note: MACV) and strengthened the network of advisors in order to direct the "special war." However, uprisings were continuing to spread in the countryside, the guerrilla war was continuously developing and the political struggle in the cities was growing. Following the collapse of Ngo Dinh Diem, with the puppet government in continuous crisis and the puppet army having suffered painful defeats at Binh Gia and Ba Gia, the "special war" was in danger of becoming a complete failure. To reverse the situation, the United States, after testing and learning the extent to which the major countries within our camp would react, sent 200,000 troops into South Vietnam to wage the "limited war"; at the same time, it unleashed the war of destruction



against the North. Their thinking was that they would put our forces in the South on the defensive, gradually wear them down and then wipe them out, that they could push the North "back to the Stone Age." However, the United States was surprised by the fact that we continued to take the offensive. We opened the Tri Thien front to attack the enemy at Khe Sanh and along Route 9. We employed well trained troops in attacks directly on Saigon and all other cities of the South during the Mau Than Tet, which shook the will of the United States to continue its aggression. The strength and will of the United States failed just as its war of aggression was being escalated to its highest levels. What caused the U.S. administration the greatest concern was the fact that while the U.S. domestic situation was in chaos because of being bogged down in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had rapidly overtaken it militarily. Some allies, such as Japan and West Germany, had become strong economic rivals of the United States. Against this background, Johnson was forced to de-escalate the war, sit down at the negotiating table and announce the "de-Americanization of the war" policy. Then, Nixon "Vietnamized the war" in order to keep the South from falling and prolonged the war by another 4 years. Nixon widened the war, intensified the attacks against both zones of the country and struck a diplomatic deal to have China impede our people's efforts to reunify the country. In the end, however, he was forced to accept defeat, to recognize South Vietnam as having two governments, two armies and two zones of control. The United States was forced to withdraw all of its forces while our main force units remained on the battlefield.

In summary, through the lackey government and army, the United States sought to crush the revolution and impose U.S. 'neo-colonialism' in the South. However, defeated in this attempt, the United States was forced to utilize expeditionary forces and its war machine in a vain attempt to reverse the situation. Defeated in this attempt, too, the United States must, in the end, withdraw its forces. However, it still hopes that the lackeys in the South can hold on with the support of 1 million puppet troops, 20,000 U.S. advisors and a significant amount of aid, can still control the cities and the major portion of the countryside. Thus, the United States came here because it thought that it was strong and we were weak, that it would win victory and we would be defeated. Now, the United States must leave because we are strong and it is weak, we have won victory and taken a very large stride forward while it has been defeated and taken a serious step backwards. For the immediate future, the United States will remain in the South. However, if our strength grows and our position becomes increasingly solid, if the Americans and the puppets are unable to undermine the Paris Agreement, the United States will ultimately have to withdraw entirely. If the opposite happens, the United States will remain in the South permanently.

What were our strategic aims when signing the Paris Agreement?

Although we say that the United States must leave because it has been defeated, because it is weak, we know that the United States still possesses enormous potential and has many evil plans that have yet to be tried. We have never subjectively maintained that they are "exhausted." Although we were winning continuous victories and had grown stronger, we were still facing many difficulties. The aid being received from our camp was not as large or timely as we had hoped it would be. The compromise, the conspiracy between the

United States and China further complicated our resistance war effort. In view of these circumstances, we had to establish a very solid position from which to move forward, a position that assured us of victory. It was precisely for this reason that we signed the Paris Agreement. To us, the important part of the Paris Agreement is not that it recognizes two governments, two armies and two zones of control and will eventually lead to the establishment of a trilateral government, rather, the key aspects of the agreement are that U.S. forces must withdraw while our forces remain in place, the North-South corridor remains intact and the rear area is linked to the frontlines as a single, unbroken chain. Our offensive position on the battlefield remains strong. Our aim in signing the agreement was to retain our position and forces in the South so that we could continue to attack the enemy. Through the Paris Agreement, we have instituted democracy and broken the enemy's grip. We have organized and assembled the masses within a broader patriotic front, split the lackeys and isolated the enemy in order to further weaken all forces of the puppet government and army and eventually eliminate them completely. If the enemy fails to observe the agreement and resumes the war, we now have the position and forces needed to counter-attack and annihilate them. We are now entirely capable of dealing with the situation, regardless of how it develops. Our resolve is to advance to total victory, never to stop. In signing the agreement, we displayed very firm resolve as well as much flexibility. We are determined to win final victory but we know how to win victory gradually. This shows that our understanding of Lenin's view concerning continuous revolution is thorough and complete. Since the August Revolution, our people have had to fight many large and powerful imperialists. The revolution has gone through many different stages, has steadily developed from one stage to the next and must ultimately achieve success throughout Vietnam. Such is the course that our country's revolution must inevitably follow.

Do we now face a strategic opportunity for completely liberating the South?

At this point in time, opportunity does indeed lie before us. It is an opportunity that has only come about as a result of 20 years of fighting, an opportunity that we must seize in order to advance the cause of national liberation to total victory.

After North Vietnam was liberated and became the outpost of the socialist system in Southeast Asia, the U.S. imperialists established the SEATO military alliance, thereby further strengthening the encirclement of the socialist countries, and back then, possessed of grand ambitions and subjective in its thinking, the United States felt certain that it could easily achieve its ends and eventually monopolize all of Southeast Asia, a region of strategic military and economic importance in the western Pacific. Now that the United States has been defeated, it has had to pursue another course, the course of sharing interests and spheres of influence with a number of other powers that also have designs on this region and are eager to rule it. Based on their bargaining with one another, they have stated that no one has exclusive control over Southeast Asia. Of course, the United States does not want China or Japan to control Southeast Asia. Conversely, China and Japan do not want the United States to control this region by itself, either. Although they are fighting amongst themselves over this issue, all of them are worried that

Vietnam's revolution will grow in strength and win total victory, all of them consider a unified, independent Vietnam that has close ties to and is united with an independent and unified Laos and Cambodia will pose a major obstacle to their expansionist designs. Therefore, they have been looking for every way to impede the advance by Vietnam, to prolong the partitioning of our country in a vain attempt to weaken us. To achieve this end, the United States hoped to use China to exert pressure upon and force us to cease our efforts following the signing of the Paris Agreement. At the same time, the United States has considered the use of economic measures, of war reparations, as an inducement through which to regain its position. At this point in time, Vietnam is not only an issue that has brought the two world systems into confrontation, but is also, in objective terms, in the strategic calculations of the aggressor and expansionist powers that are fighting amongst themselves for control of Southeast Asia, an important rival that must be subjugated. Although their scheme is a very dangerous one, none of these powers is currently prepared to carry it out. China and Japan lack the necessary strength. The United States has been defeated and is withdrawing. In the immediate future, it seeks to maintain a stable situation in the South for a number of years in order to keep the puppet government on its feet and give the United States time to overcome its large economic and political problems at home.

As regards the comparison of forces between ourselves and the puppets, we are in a victorious position, a position from which we can move forward; to the contrary, because they have suffered continuous defeats, the position and forces of the puppets are deteriorating, both militarily and politically.

In view of all the factors presented above, it is our assertion that this is the best opportunity that our people have ever had for completing the liberation of the South and winning complete victory in the national democratic revolution while helping Laos and Cambodia achieve national liberation. If we wait for another 10 or 15 years, by which time the puppets will have managed to pick themselves up, the aggressor powers will be back at full strength and the expansionists will be stronger, the situation will be exceedingly complex.

The key factor to be considered when making this strategic decision is whether or not the United States will return to the South.

Although the United States is, by nature, very obstinate and still has many cunning designs, the United States is currently withdrawing and once it has left, it will not be easy for the United States to return, because it is still reeling, still smarting from a long string of defeats following the process of becoming involved, then becoming bogged down, of escalating then de-escalating, a process from which this is the first opportunity it has had to extricate itself. Obstinate remaining in the South until the end is one thing, but returning to the South another time is something else. In selecting this strategic opportunity, it is our estimation that it is impossible for the United States to return. However, we also maintain that even if the United States does return and intervene to some extent, it cannot reverse the situation and we will still be victorious.

The question facing us is to determine how best to strike and win victory. As I mentioned earlier, it would clearly be dangerous for us to wait for another 10 or 15 years. However, to attack in a way that is not well organized, in a way that causes us to meet with great difficulties will also give rise to complications. This opportunity demands that we strike quickly, that we be systematic and thorough but also clever. Only in this way can we achieve the element of surprise and not give anyone time to react. Can we do this? We are in unanimous agreement that this is what we must do and that we will certainly succeed.

How have our forces compared to those of the enemy since the signing of the Paris Agreement?

In the final analysis, the success or failure of a revolution is determined by the comparison of forces. In war, the stronger forces are victorious, the weaker are defeated. However, strengths and weaknesses must be viewed from a revolutionary perspective, from the viewpoint of how they are developing, must be determined on the basis of an overall evaluation of military and political factors, of position, forces and opportunity, of objective circumstances and the art of leadership, must be determined by examining these factors as they are developing within a specific region and time frame. Strengths and weaknesses cannot be compared or evaluated simply on the basis of the sizes of armies, the number of units and bases or the availability of weapons, equipment and means of war. In 1965 and 1966, the United States sent 200,000 expeditionary troops into South Vietnam. But the United States sent in these forces after having been defeated in the "special war" and after we had established a solid deployment of forces and positions all across the battlefield. It was our assessment, therefore, that the position and forces of the United States were not strong and that we could still retain the initiative and continue to attack. In 1968, when the total number of enemy troops climbed to more than 1.2 million, with the number of U.S. forces increasing to more than one-half million, we decided to attack Saigon and the other cities, attack nerve centers, bases and warehouses to force the enemy to draw back to defensive positions. The successes achieved as a result of these decisions reflected the correct approach taken by us in evaluating the comparison of forces. The different results achieved from the activities conducted on each specific battlefield also stemmed mainly from different ways of evaluating our forces and those of the enemy.

According to a report from Sau Dan in Region 9, the ratio between our forces and enemy forces is 1:8. However, because we know our strengths and the enemy's weaknesses well, we have learned how to take the offensive and have been able to win victories. Conversely, in Tri Thien, the ratio between our forces and those of the enemy is 1:2; however, because they have overestimated the enemy's strengths and not realized our own strengths, the local comrades there have leaned more toward a defensive posture and drawn back, thus causing us to lose ground and allowing the enemy to make inroads, to carry out pacification and divide the region into individual lines and zones.

We must employ the same dialectical approach in evaluating the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy following the signing of the Paris Agreement. By forcing the opposition to sign the agreement, we showed that we

were strong, were fully capable of winning victory over both the United States and the puppets. We won that victory while U.S. forces were still here. After all U.S. forces have been withdrawn, our strength will be even greater and we will surely win complete victory over the puppet army. It was precisely because of this concern that the U.S. postponed the signing of the agreement on many different occasions in an attempt to gain time to send additional weapons, ammunition and economic aid to the South and consolidate and strengthen the puppet government and army to enable them to contend with us. Logic would dictate that the situation and the comparison of forces continue to develop in the same direction following the signing of the Paris Agreement. However, in 1973, the puppets seized the initiative at a number of places on the battlefield. It was mistakes and shortcomings on our part that allowed the enemy to do what they did. While the enemy was obstinately breaking the agreement and taking the offensive, we were harboring some illusions, were waiting and assuming a passive posture, even retreating at some places. As a result, our position deteriorated and the enemy's improved. Conversely, at places where we have appropriately taken the initiative and launched attacks, not only are we still strong, but our position and forces have been strengthened two or three-fold. This is how the situation developed at the very outset in Region 9 following the signing of the Paris Agreement and, later, in Region 5 as well as other regions. In late 1973 and early 1974, following determined attacks and counter-attacks by us, the enemy revealed their weaknesses. Main force puppet troops are weak from the standpoint of their positions and mobility. Their firepower, means of war and rear service reserves are also weak and their morale is steadily declining. The puppets' local forces still occupy tens of thousands of positions but their ability to control the population has declined. Many units do not dare conduct operations. They are encircled by the masses and scatter in large groups when attacked. If we include the political, economic and cultural difficulties and the difficult living conditions that exist within the zone under enemy control, in the countryside as well as the cities, especially if we include the weakened political position of the puppet government as a result of the bitter opposition of the public, the antagonisms among the lackeys themselves and the antagonisms between the Nguyen Van Thieu administration and the U.S. imperialists, the weakness of the enemy can be considered comprehensive.

As for ourselves, when making this strategic decision, we must be fully aware of its importance. At the same time, we must foresee all the difficulties and complications that the enemy might pose, must be fully aware of our own weaknesses, especially with regard to building the real strength of the resolution as presented in the report by the Military Commission. However, what must be emphasized here is the need to recognize the tremendous capabilities and forces that can and must be mobilized to achieve a combined strength so that we can win victory in this final test of strength with the enemy.

The strength that we possess is primarily the strength of the people exercising ownership, the strength of the entire country fighting the enemy, from the North to the South, from the rear area to the frontlines. Throughout the fight that we have been waging over the past 30 years, in its thinking and sentiments, in its revolutionary actions and strategic deployment, in the



leadership and guidance that have been provided, the entire country has been unswerving in its pursuit of peace, independence and a united North and South. The people's national, democratic revolution in the South and the socialist revolution in the North have coalesced as one but the greatest strength, the determining factor is the North, is the rear area. As the war enters its final stage, the decisive role played by the rear area assumes even greater importance. We will not only mobilize the military and political forces in the South, both within the liberated zone as well as the zone now under enemy control, but also throw into this decisive fight the well trained, main force military corps and virtually all of the strategic reserve forces and abundant stockpiles of the North.

The strength that we possess is the strength that flows from the two causes of national independence and socialism, which are closely tied to the three revolutionary currents of our times. It is because of this that our people have received enormous assistance from the fraternal socialist countries and all progressive mankind in their war of resistance. This is one of the factors guaranteeing us of victory over the ringleader of imperialism.

The strength that we possess is the strength of the people's war. Today, there are many different types of wars, wars of many different sizes and wars that employ many different weapons. However, when strength is the subject of discussion, it is nuclear war and people's war that are given the most attention. Although a nuclear war is very dangerous, when the people of the world's countries recognize the threat of annihilation posed by this kind of war and recognize who it is that will unleash such a war, they will surely possess all the strength needed to block the hands of the bellicose imperialists. Among all the conventional wars that have been fought to date, the people's war has proven to be invincible and has always resulted in the defeat of aggressors. When fighting aggressors, the people are always the victors.

The Vietnamese people's war of today carries on our ancient forefathers' tradition of resisting foreign aggression and incorporates their skill in the art of war. There have been times in history when we have fought for 10 continuous years to make the country whole and times when, through attacks conducted with lightning-like speed, aggressor forces have been driven beyond our borders in only 10 days. However, in every period, we have used small forces to fight large forces, few forces to fight the many forces of the enemy, charity and justice to prevail over cruelty and employed the strength of the people as masters to bring peace to the country. This tradition is being enhanced and raised to a new level of development, one closely associated with Marxist-Leninist military thinking.

The Vietnamese people's war of today is the combined result of applying the correct and creative revolutionary line and method set forth by our party. In the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the people's war is a military and political war, a war that unfolds mainly in the form of uprisings and attacks, attacks and uprisings, a war that combines uprisings by the masses with revolutionary warfare and applies suitable methods of fighting in the three different strategic zones. The fundamental guidelines in the people's war, guidelines that are based on thorough adherence to the thinking

of an offensive strategy, are to seize control in order to wipe out the enemy, wipe out the enemy in order to seize control, wage a protracted fight, win victory gradually and eventually win total victory. The methods of fighting employed in this war combine the "three spearheads," utilize the three elements of the military, combine guerrilla warfare with conventional warfare and coordinate small, medium and large-scale attacks while attaching importance to killing enemy forces and destroying their rear service facilities, means of war, nerve centers... These elements in the nature of laws have become military science and art. They are consistent with the historical and geographical circumstances of Vietnam, with the characteristics and capabilities of the Vietnamese and tap the strength of each person, each unit, each locality and the common strength of the entire country.

The war of resistance against the United States for national salvation that is being fought in the South is a war of resistance against foreign aggression and, in some respects, also a civil war. For more than 10 years, we continuously fought and defeated the political and military efforts of the U.S. imperialists and have now driven the U.S. expeditionary army back to the United States. Our main task now is to topple the lackey regime, specifically to topple the Nguyen Van Thieu administration, the representative of the interests of the feudal class, the compradore bourgeoisie, the bureaucrats, the militarists.

We are determined to mobilize the greatest possible efforts by the entire party, the entire army and all the people in both the South and the North, to launch a final general offensive and uprising, raise the revolutionary war to its highest level of development, wipe out or rout the entire puppet army, attack and occupy Saigon, the stronghold of the enemy, as well as all other cities, topple the puppet government on the central and all other levels, put all political power into the hands of the people, completely liberate the South, complete the people's national, democratic revolution throughout the country and proceed toward the reunification of the country. We must immediately begin working very hard to make all the necessary preparations, to create the fullest possible conditions and material bases so that we can strike with power, strike swiftly and win complete and thorough victory in 1975 or 1976.

Total victory in the great resistance against the United States for national salvation will not only usher in a new era for our country's revolution, but also strongly influence the revolutionary struggle being waged by the peoples of other countries. And, 10 or 20 years in the future, Vietnam's victory over the United States will still have a far-reaching impact upon the course of development of many nations.

We are undertaking an historic mission, one larger and more serious than any we have undertaken to date. However, never before have we been as heartened and elated as we are today. Our entire party, all our people and our entire army, our entire country, from the North to the South, must be determined to complete this mission. Our fellow countrymen and our friends and brothers throughout the world are awaiting our victory.

We cannot be half-hearted or hesitate in the face of this opportunity!

The Speech Concluding the Second Round of the Political Bureau Conference on the Situation and Tasks of the Resistance Against the United States for National Salvation

7 January 1975

Dear comrades,

During its previous meeting, the Political Bureau reached unanimous agreement concerning the strategic guidelines for advancing the resistance against the United States for national salvation to total victory. During this round, the Political Bureau has engaged in additional discussion of this matter with comrades from the South. All of the principle comrades in charge of the Region 5 and Nam Bo battlefields are here. We have reached complete agreement in the following areas: our evaluation of the situation since the signing of the Paris Agreement; our evaluation of the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy; our assessment of the historic opportunity that lies before us; the strategic decision to complete the people's national, democratic revolution in the South in 1975 or 1976; and our tasks, targets and stages of implementation.

The concluding speech I delivered during the first round dealt with these important issues. Today, instead of reiterating all that has been said, I will only summarize the matters that you have discussed and express some additional thoughts to reaffirm the decision of the Political Bureau and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee.

I. The Situation in the South During the 2 Years Since the Signing of the Paris Agreement

The Party Central Committee has pointed out that the purposes of signing the Paris Agreement were to drive the United States from the South, win a fundamental victory over the enemy and lay the groundwork for eventually completing the people's national, democratic revolution throughout the country. To achieve these objectives, we must make full use of the factors of victory and the new capabilities that have become ours as a result of the Paris Agreement: the revolutionary government and revolutionary armed forces, the liberated zone, the political forces and political struggle of the masses within the zone controlled by the enemy and the basic rights acknowledged by the agreement: peace, independence, democracy and national concord.

However, due to the failure to fully understand the strategic intentions of the Central Committee and correctly evaluate the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy, some places initially allowed the enemy to make inroads and allowed our forces to fall into a defensive posture. In late 1973 and early 1974, in coordination with the political and diplomatic struggles, we launched determined counter-attacks and attacks, thwarting the enemy's attempts to encroach upon and occupy territory of ours. Our retaliatory blows were supported by public opinion at home and abroad. Everyone, even persons within the ranks of the reactionaries in Saigon, clearly saw Nguyen Van Thieu as the one who was violating the agreement and continuing the war and saw us as brandishing the banners of peace and national concord.



The above mentioned policy created new strengths for us in the following areas:

First, we seized the initiative on all battlefields, punished the enemy for their encroachment and occupation operations, won back portions of the population and areas that had been lost and expanded our liberated zone.

Secondly, we have consolidated and improved our unbroken strategic position extending from the North into the South, from the mountain jungles of Tri Thien to the Central Highlands, eastern Nam Bo and the Mekong Delta.

Thirdly, we have established and strengthened mobile, main force military corps in the mountainous jungles and stockpiled strategic materials in important areas.

Fourthly, we have improved the situation in the rural areas of the lowlands and established staging areas adjacent to the major cities; in particular, in the Nam Bo Delta, a number of large, main force units have been established, something which we had heretofore been unable to do.

Fifthly, we have succeeded in launching a political struggle under the slogan "peace, independence and national concord."

Sixthly, we have continued to win additional strong sympathy and support from the revolutionary forces and progressive people of the world.

We have also displayed a number of weaknesses. We have failed to meet the standards on troop strength, troop quality, equipment, organization and cadres in the building of main force units and local forces, especially with regard to their ability to coordinate in large-scale combat operations that last for many days. In the countryside, we have not coordinated the three offensive elements well. The local forces, militia and guerrilla forces at many places are still weak and have not created a position that supports the masses in struggle. In the cities, the political struggle has yet to become a truly widespread mass movement. In summary, during the past 2 years, due to shortcomings in our guidance and leadership, limited success has been achieved in making full use of the new factors of victory and the new capabilities that exist.

As regards the enemy, they do possess certain strengths: the puppets still have a 700,000 man army consisting of 13 main force divisions. The enemy still controls virtually all major cities, still controls the densely populated rural areas, is still receiving U.S. military and economic aid and is still commanded by U.S. advisors. Nevertheless, the enemy's position has been steadily deteriorating and their forces are becoming weaker. This can be seen in the following areas:

First, the puppet army, from its main force units to local forces, is on the defensive and the majority of its units are pinned down. A few units are still mobile, but only partly mobile. Generally speaking, main force troops are not fulfilling their role of supporting local forces.

Secondly, the various elements of the local forces, such as the security forces and "civil guard," are less able to control the population and are no longer capable of serving as reserve forces. More than a few units have scattered when attacked by us.

Thirdly, the ability of the various branches of the puppet military to coordinate in combat is poorly developed and weak. The strength of their air, artillery, tank and armored forces has declined very much.

Fourthly, the morale of the puppet army has taken another serious drop. The collapse of units and desertions are mounting. Field grade commanders are being replaced and their ranks are in disorder. Generally speaking, the puppet army is losing its fighting strength, has suffered a serious loss of confidence and defeatism is spreading within it.

Fifthly, the zone under enemy control has been divided. The "pacification" plan is failing. When the enemy goes out into the field to try to improve their situation, they are attacked and wiped out; when they pull back to defensive positions, they lose a portion of the population, lose land.

Sixthly, the political and economic situation, especially in the cities, has never been more difficult or chaotic as it is now. During the past several decades, the puppet regime lived on aid from the U.S. imperialists. Now that the Americans have withdrawn, the resulting big drop in aid has caused disruption and disorder within the economy and threatens the life of the people. Opposition among the people to the puppet government is stronger than ever before. Internally, the enemy are fighting amongst themselves and tearing one another apart. Various factions and religious leaders are in conflict with the regime. There is also dissension between the Americans and their lackeys.

Nguyen Van Thieu will find it difficult to hold on in the face of this military, political and economic situation.

This important change in the comparison of forces has come about only as a result of many years of arduous struggle by the revolution in the South, in particular, and the Vietnamese revolution, in general. Never before have there been such favorable conditions, such possibilities for combining the military and political struggles within one offensive. When the "uprisings" of 1959 and 1960 broke out, our political forces were powerful and the political struggle was intense but our revolutionary forces were still small. During the periods we spent retaliating against the "special war" and the "limited war" of the United States, our revolutionary armed forces grew steadily but the political struggle, although it developed, was not widespread. As a result, the military struggle and the political struggle were not well coordinated. The current situation is vastly different. The United States suffered continuous defeats and had to withdraw its forces. The puppet army and government no longer enjoy the base of support they once had. Our army is in top shape and present throughout the South. The masses within the zone under enemy control are calling for an uprising and a new spirit exists among them.

In 1974, as our momentum and forces grew rapidly, the enemy's situation worsened militarily, politically and economically. If we were to launch a strong offensive, we would surely cause new and sudden changes in this process of decline.

During the previous round, we examined the international background behind the Vietnam war. During this round, we have deeply analyzed the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy. On the basis of the assessments made in both rounds, we now have a clearer picture of the historic opportunity and the real possibilities that exist for fighting the final battle and advancing the resistance against the United States for national salvation to total victory. We are in agreement that we must quickly make all the preparations needed to bring the war to a victorious conclusion in 1975 or 1976. This determination of the Political Bureau must be conveyed to all cadres, party members, Youth Union members and the people. We must conduct widespread and thorough political and ideological work and build a strong spirit of determination to fight and win.

## II. Our Tasks and Battle Plans

The tasks that lie before us are to seize this historic opportunity, launch many continuous full-scale campaigns, fight decisive battles, bring the resistance against the United States to a victorious conclusion, complete the people's national, democratic revolution in the South and begin taking steps toward reunifying the fatherland. Once the people's national, democratic revolution has been completed, we will, of necessity, begin the advance by the entire country toward socialism. While performing this task, we will join with and help the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia move forward.

To achieve these ends, we must make every effort to carry out the following specific tasks and meet the following requirements:

First, through large-scale attacks and uprisings, we must destroy the subsectors and district seats, defeat the "pacification" plan and gain control of the majority of the rural areas in the Nam Bo Delta, the lowlands of Region 5 and Tri Thien. This will be an important strategic blow, one that will greatly weaken the enemy, deprive them of all of their sources of logistical support, greatly increase our strength, give us a strong foothold in the rural lowlands, divide the enemy's forces and put our forces in positions close to the cities.

Secondly, we must launch campaigns that are coordinated among the various branches of our main force troops, mount strong attacks on the main force units of the puppets, kill many of their forces, put many regiments and divisions out of combat and break the back of the puppet army. We must encircle, destroy and occupy important strategic areas, further expand the liberated zone and improve our strategic bases so that the attacks and uprisings can be intensified.

Thirdly, in coordination with the attacks on main force puppet units and the attacks to thwart rural "pacification," we must surround and threaten the major cities, especially Saigon, and develop the political movement for peace

and national concord on a large scale. If the United States overthrows Thieu, we must quickly launch a mass uprising to topple the puppet government and establish revolutionary governments on the lower levels while struggling to establish a coalition government on the upper level.

Fourthly, enemy proselyting efforts must be accelerated to keep pace with the scale and intensity of attacks and uprisings in order to quickly rout puppet forces when we launch strong attacks. At places where the necessary conditions exist, we must encourage revolts and defections within a number of puppet units.

Fifthly, we must destroy the rear service bases and means of war of the enemy in order to deprive them of all sources of reserve manpower and materiel. Strong attacks must be mounted against enemy nerve centers and enemy communication lines must be cut. We must continue to improve our own communications and transportation lines to insure that our army receives all the material and technical support needed to fight continuously for many days.

In performing these tasks and meeting these requirements, we must bear in mind that our objectives are to achieve a combined strength, to coordinate military activities with the political struggle, uprisings with the war, coordinate the "three spearheads," the three strategic zones, wipe out the enemy in order to gain control, gain control in order to wipe out the enemy, launch a general offensive and uprising and win victory over the enemy within their most important stronghold, Saigon, in order to bring the war to an end.

Fighting this final battle is primarily the task of the military and political forces on the Nam Bo battlefield, which include the forces of Saigon-Gia Dinh; at the same time, it is the task of the armed forces and people of our entire country, a task in which our regional main force units and main force military corps brought in from other battlefields will play the decisive role.

The operational plan for 1975 defines the task of each battlefield; at the same time, it orients the operations on all battlefields toward the common objective of moving on the final stronghold of the enemy by the most direct route possible to participate in the decisive, strategic battle.

The Nam Bo battlefield has three important tasks: defeating "pacification"; attacking main force puppet units; and encircling the cities. To defeat "pacification," the focal point of which is the Mekong Delta, we must use from 20,000 to 30,000 main force troops in eastern Nam Bo in attacks down in the delta, coordinate these attacks with the attacks and uprisings by local military and political forces and connect the liberated areas of eastern Nam Bo with those in Region 8 and Region 9. At the same time, we must bring strong pressure to bear in the direction of My Tho and Saigon, especially Saigon, and create a situation conducive to mass uprisings in these cities. To support the encirclement of Saigon, our main force units must wipe out an important contingent of the puppet main force troops in eastern Nam Bo.

On the battlefields of Region 5 and the Central Highlands, three main force divisions must be employed in attacks on the Central Highlands in order to open a corridor from the southern Central Highlands to eastern Nam Bo so that

main force units can quickly move into eastern Nam Bo and coordinate with its main force troops in the attack on Saigon. If possible, we should attack and occupy Buon Me Thuot in the opening battle and then move straight down to Thuy Hoa and Phu Yen, cut the Region 5 lowlands in half and open another direction from which to rapidly move southward to encircle and pressure Saigon.

Forces of Military Region 5 and the military and political forces of the coastal provinces of central Vietnam must be used to liberate the territory from Binh Dinh northward in order to exert pressure in the direction of Da Nang.

On the Tri Thien battlefield, we must attack and occupy the lowlands, establish firm control from southern Hue southward, cut off Hue from Da Nang, encircle and exert pressure on both of these cities, not allow the enemy to regroup to the South and encourage revolts and defections in Central Vietnam.

When the opportunity arises, three additional divisions will be sent into eastern Nam Bo. Two corps will be employed in swift attacks to wipe out several puppet main force division there and then penetrate to Saigon.

Plans must be prepared in the South as well as the North to deal with the possibility of the United States using air and naval forces to counter-attack. The chances of the United States coming back and intervening in the Vietnam war are slight. However, even if this possibility is as slight as 5 or 7 percent, we must still guard against it, because the United States still has the intention of maintaining neo-colonialism. Whatever the United States does, it will be limited, such as supplying a small amount of additional military and economic aid or, at the very most supplying air and naval support (provided that the puppets are able to hold on for a long time).

The above are the main military attacks that make up the 1975 strategic plan. This plan has our unanimous support. In the process of implementing it, we will, depending upon developments on the battlefield, lead and command our troops in launching the strongest possible attacks and achieving the greatest possible element of surprise in order to achieve our objective as quickly as possible, complete and thorough victory in Saigon.

The plan for 1976 will be based on the results achieved under the plan for 1975. We must make the greatest possible effort to achieve complete victory in 1975. This is a realistic possibility.

Here in the North, the Party Central Committee and government will do their very best to strengthen our forces and fully meet the material and technical needs of the battlefield, considering this to be the basic prerequisite to victory. Another requirement of pressing importance is the need to prepare strategic reserve forces. We will draft 300,000 new troops, accelerate troop training and provide thorough cadre training. We will perform very good political and ideological work within the army and among the people and build a high spirit of "everything for the frontlines, everything for victory" throughout the army and among all the people.

We must make skillful use of the weapon of diplomatic struggle to help brandish the banners of peace, independence and national concord with a view toward isolating the obstinate lackeys, shedding additional light on our just cause, winning the sympathy and support of the revolutionary forces and progressive people of the world and thwarting attempts by the U.S. imperialists and international reactionaries to intervene or commit sabotage.

We have reached unanimous agreement concerning all of these matters at this conference. Following this conference, there are many jobs that must be performed in a very urgent manner. On the frontlines, the various party committee echelons must provide close, detailed leadership and guidance in every area from the formulation of plans for the deployment of forces and the coordination of attacks to the coordination of combat operations between the locality and the battlefield in the South and the entire country. Here in the North, the general staff must continue to improve the plan of attack adopted in 1974 and define in greater detail such matters as how this plan's implementation will be organized, how forces will be built, how forces will be deployed on the battlefield and how rear service support will be provided. The general staff has a very important responsibility in implementing this historic decision by the Political Bureau.

This strategic battle will be a great undertaking. It will bring our people's war of resistance against the United States for national salvation to total victory, thereby helping to change the situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia and opening a new stage in the development of the revolutionary movement of the people of the world. Our party is determined to fulfill its glorious historic mission for the nation and its noble international obligation. We still face many difficulties. However, through the tradition of heroism and the inexhaustible creativity of our army and people, we will surely overcome all of them. Victory will surely be ours!

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CSO: 4210/8

K.U. CHERNENKO PASSES AWAY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pages unnumbered

[Notice from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the National Assembly, Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam]

[Text] It is with a profound sense of sorrow that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the National Assembly, Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam hereby inform the party and people of Vietnam:

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, passed away at 1920 hours on 10 March 1985 in Moscow.

The name and tireless activities of K.U. Chernenko are closely identified with large victories by the Soviet Union in developing the national economy, improving the defense capabilities of the Soviet Union and safeguarding peace on earth. K.U. Chernenko was especially concerned with strengthening the unity and solidarity of the socialist community and the international communist movement.

K.U. Chernenko held warm feelings of fraternal friendship for our people and provided our people with wholehearted assistance in their work of building and defending the fatherland.

The passing of K.U. Chernenko is an enormous loss to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, to our party and people and progressive mankind.

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CSO: 4210/8



EULOGY OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, COUNCIL OF STATE,  
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE VIETNAM FATHERLAND FRONT

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pages unnumbered

[Text]. Dear comrades and fellow countrymen,

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, our esteemed comrade, has left us forever. His passing is a loss, a loss for which nothing can compensate, to the communist party, the Soviet state and people of the fraternal Soviet Union as well as to the communist party, state and people of Vietnam, the international communist and worker movement and progressive mankind. With the passing of K.U. Chernenko, the CPSU, Soviet state and people of the Soviet Union have lost a great leader. The international communist and worker movement, the national liberation movement and the peace-loving people of the entire world have lost a staunch and distinguished activist who dedicated his life to the lofty ideals of happiness and peace for everyone on our planet.

As general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, K.U. Chernenko and the other leaders of the Soviet Union's communist party and state, led the Soviet people in continuing their forward progress in the work of perfecting developed socialism, constantly improving the standard of living of the people and strengthening national defense forces of the Soviet state.

Loyal to the doctrine of the great V.I. Lenin, K. U. Chernenko constantly concerned himself with strengthening the solidarity of the community of socialist countries, of the international communist and worker movement as well as the national liberation movement in the world. We greatly appreciated the large contribution made by K. U. Chernenko, head of the Soviet Union delegation, to the success of the historic High Level Conference of CEMA that was held in Moscow, a conference that marked a new stage of economic development for the community of socialist countries and spread the positive influence of socialism throughout the world.

A staunch fighter in the cause of peace, K. U. Chernenko proposed many important initiatives designed to reduce the threat of nuclear war and made very large contributions to the struggle for peace and the security of nations.



Dear comrades,

A great friend of the Vietnamese, K. U. Chernenko made valuable contributions to strengthening and developing the great friendship, the militant solidarity and the comprehensive cooperation between the two parties, the two states and the people of the two countries of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. His beautiful feelings and heartfelt support for the revolutionary cause of our people will forever be deeply engraved in the hearts of the Vietnamese.

At this moment of grief, our entire party and people, in keeping with the teaching of the esteemed President Ho Chi Minh, pledge to do their very best to strengthen the unshakeable friendship and revolutionary solidarity between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which have stood the test of time, and so that they endure forevermore. We consider this to be the obligation, the sentiment, the most noble mandate of the conscience of each of us.

Sharing the deep sorrow of the communist party and people of the Soviet Union, we are fully confident that the people of the Soviet Union, united closely around the Central Committee of the CPSU headed by the esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the outstanding leader of the Soviet party and state, a man who is worthy to carry on the glorious work of K. U. Chernenko, will successfully implement the resolution of the 26th Party Congress, actively prepare for the 27th Congress of the CPSU and successfully complete the plans for building the material and technical bases of communism for the sake of the strength and prosperity of the Soviet Union, for the sake of the causes of peace and revolution of the people of the world.

Dear comrades and fellow countrymen,

With a sense of profound sorrow and grief, our entire party and people respectfully bid farewell to K. U. Chernenko.

The name and glorious career of K. U. Chernenko will forever be deeply etched in the feelings of the communists and people of the Soviet Union as well as the communists and people of Vietnam and the communists and progressive people of the entire world.

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CSO: 4210/8

A VALUABLE BOOK BY K. U. CHERNENKO: 'SOME MATTERS CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE PARTY AND STATE APPARATUS'

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 45-53

[Article by Dao Duy Tung]

[Text] Amidst the jubilant atmosphere surrounding the celebration of the 67th anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution and on the occasion of the celebration of the 73rd anniversary of the birth of K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, our people, to their great delight, are now able to read the valuable book "Some Matters Concerning the Work of the Party and State Apparatus" by K. U. Chernenko and the preface entitled "Together with My Vietnamese Readers" that he wrote on the occasion of the publication of the Vietnamese version of this book.

In this book, K.U. Chernenko, the outstanding leader of the Soviet party and state, a man who has held numerous important positions within leadership organizations over a period of many decades, summarizes the experiences in improving the organizational apparatus of the Soviet party and state and experiences concerning its style of operation. On this basis he presents many lessons of theoretical and practical importance.

"This book--as the authors writes in the preface--encompasses a rather long period in the life of the CPSU and Soviet state. The Red thread that runs through this book is thinking concerning the need to increase the efficiency of party and state work and constantly concern ourselves with improving the style in which and the methods by which this work is performed."

1. Comprehensively Developing All Elements of the Soviet Political System

In the building of the new system, the building of the political system plays a decisive role in each victory of the revolution. The CPSU considers this an important guideline in all of the work of the Soviet party and state to build socialism and communism.

In this book, K. U. Chernenko discusses the importance of and, in particular, the specifics involved in strengthening the political system within the Soviet Union: strengthening the leadership role of the party, the leader of

communist construction; strengthening the state of all the people as the main tool in communist construction; strengthening the role of the social organizations as integral and necessary components of the Soviet political system. All of these efforts reflect the superior nature of Soviet democracy.

He states that the soviets of people's deputies are the political foundation of the Soviet Union and that it is through these soviets that the people exercise their state power. "In our country, the people exercise their state power primarily through bodies of elected state representatives, the soviets of people's deputies, which form the political foundation of the Soviet Union. The soviets of people's deputies give full expression to the democracy of our social system"(page 57).\*

The soviets in the Soviet Union--the membership of which numbers nearly 2.3 million deputies of the various classes and strata of society, two-thirds of whom are worker or peasant deputies--have a legislative function as well as an executive function. Each activity of the soviets is based on the practice of true democracy and conducted under regular inspection by the masses.

With regard to the relationship between the party and the soviets, the author points out: "Everything that pertains to the soviets, to the soviet government, always has been, is and will be the work of the entire party"(p 61).

In this work, the author touches upon many matters concerning improving the operations of the soviets, of the executive organizations, from their tasks and authority to their organization and mode of operation. The reader sees very clearly that a wealth of experience has been gained in the building of the soviet state.

Within the political system of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Trade Unions--which have a membership of 130 million--occupy an important position. Faithful to the instructions of V.I. Lenin and on the basis of the current situation, the author states: "Within the context of developed socialism, the party considers the Trade Unions to be a dependable base among the masses, a powerful means by which to develop the democratic system and gain the involvement of workers in communist construction"(p 85).

The Trade Unions of the Soviet Union have been given broad authority to deal with matters regarding production management, wages, labor safety, social security... As K.U. Chernenko says: "It can be said that everything involved in caring for man, from birth until he passes from life, lies within the scope of activity of the Trade Union(p 86). However, according to him, looking after the interests of the worker mainly involves giving attention to developing the national economy and increasing production.

K.U. Chernenko explains the mode of operation of the Trade Unions and stresses that "maintaining the closest possible ties to the masses, giving attention to them and understanding what they feel in their souls, these are the characteristics that distinguish the Trade Union cadre in our times"(p 91).

In this work, the Lenin Communist Youth Union is mentioned as a social organization of major importance in the Soviet Union. With 41.4 million members, the union "plays a positive role in the country's socio-political life, in strengthening the ties between the party and the masses" and "is the competent assistant, the reserve force of the party"(p 92). In order for the Youth Union to complete its mission, it must be placed under the direct leadership of the party.

The primary and most important aspect of the Youth Union's work is to help train the young generation to be political activists who know their jobs well, love to work and are ready to defend the fatherland.

Today, there are 1.5 million party members within the Youth Union. Through these party members, the party conveys its experiences to youths and insures that youths constantly brandish the banner of communism.

K.U. Chernenko devotes many pages in this book to discussing the leadership role of the communist party within the political system of the Soviet Union. He points out: "Bringing about the comprehensive development of all elements of the political system of Soviet society and developing the initiative and the independence of state and social organizations, these are the constant concerns of the CPSU"(pp 99-100).

The party leads the organizations of the state and society but "does not take their place, does not intervene in their internal affairs and does not impose its resolutions upon these organizations, rather, it implements its line through the communist party members working within the organizations of the state and society"(pp 101-102).

K.U. Chernenko defines the main elements of party leadership as follows: "Drafting the political line and supporting it with scientific argumentation; establishing the tasks and basic operating guidelines of these organizations; selecting, assigning, training and educating leadership cadres; systematically inspecting social organizations in their implementation of the party line; researching, summarizing and disseminating the advanced experiences gained in the work of these organizations; and heightening the vanguard role played by the communist party members who work in the mass organizations"(p 102).

More than just the general elements of party leadership are presented. What one finds very interesting here is that the author, drawing from the widely varied activities of the CPSU, presents the experiences gained by the party in leading each type Soviet organization, economic organization, Trade Union organization, youth organization, etc. The author also deeply analyzes the activities of party organizations, from issuing decisions to organizing their implementation, from educational work to organizational work, from the assignment of cadres to inspections, and draws many very profound lessons.

Expressing a general observation concerning the political system within the Soviet Union, K.U. Chernenko states: "Today, there is within the party and state an apparatus that has a stable structure and solid organization on the central as well as local levels and, through this apparatus, the CPSU has effectively led all the work involved in communist construction"(p 5).

## 2. Cadres--the Decisive Factor

The cadre issue is clearly presented by K.U. Chernenko in this book under the subtitle: "Cadres Are the Decisive Factor in Leadership and Management"(p 109).

In keeping with the instruction of V.I. Lenin, the CPSU has given its attention to training and promoting worker and peasant deputies to the management apparatus. At present, two-thirds of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets, that is, some 1.5 million persons, are manual workers or state farm workers.

It is also the policy of the CPSU to "assign young cadres who show good prospects to party, state and economic organizations while adopting a prudent attitude toward elderly cadres and making maximum use of their experience and knowledge"(p 113). Of the provincial and district secretaries of the CPSU, 29.6 percent are below the age of 40.

In the Soviet Union, attention is given to training and promoting women cadres. The CPSU has 4.8 million women members (27 percent of total party members). Women account for 49.5 percent of soviet deputies.

The CPSU has also given very much attention to establishing pools of prospective cadres in the various areas of management. These consist mainly of persons who have been elected to the agencies of the party and the soviets.

The social organizations, such as the Trade Union and Youth Union, play an important role in preparing these pools of prospective cadres. Of course, as the author writes, the search for candidates for these pools should not simply focus on desk jobs, but should mainly focus on jobs of practical importance, at places where persons are engaged in production or combat.

The fundamental principle in cadre work is that of selecting persons to be cadres on the basis of their political standards and qualities and job aptitude. Concretizing the standards of V.I. Lenin, K.U. Chernenko presents and clearly analyzes several fundamental standards. He writes: "A clear and proper ideological leaning, competency on the job and the final results of one's work, these are the standards by which the party evaluates work"(p 140). "A firm political stand and world view and loyalty to the cause of communism, these are the number one requirements which the party demands that every member meet, especially persons promoted to leadership positions"(p 142). He also says: "In our age, the age of scientific-technological advances, zeal must lead to professional expertise, to a high degree of class consciousness in the activities of every leadership cadre"(p 144).

To improve the quality of the corps of cadres, it is necessary to combine the selection and assignment of cadres with cadre training. The leadership cadre training system within the Soviet Union is a very well developed and effective system. In addition to party schools, which trained some 32,000 cadres during the years between the 25th and 26th Congresses, the party central committees of the various republics and the regional and municipal party committees hold

widespread symposiums and scientific conferences so that key leadership cadres of the party can discuss their work.

As a result of intensified cadre training, 99.9 percent of the secretaries of the party central committees in the republics, 90.8 percent of the secretaries of the regional, municipal and district party committees and 58.8 percent of party chapter secretaries had a college level education as of the start of 1982. Practically all of the chairmen of the councils of ministers of the federal republics and the autonomous republics have a college level education. Moreover, one-third of these cadres graduated from party schools and more than one-half are former state farm directors or chairmen.

While schools and classes play an important role, everyday work also provides a good environment within which to train and select cadres. K.U. Chernenko says: "The art of leadership, the art of management, is exceedingly complex and delicate work... This art is acquired not only through study, but also through practical activities and learning on one's own, educating oneself"(p 146).

### 3. The Leninist Style

K.U. Chernenko delves deeply into the matter of displaying the Leninist style in the activities of the party and state apparatus. He writes: "The CPSU has always considered and still considers the Leninist style to be a powerful ideological and organizational weapon in the struggle to transform society through revolution, to be the prerequisite to successful activities by all party organizations, soviets and economic organizations in the implementation of all of our plans, to be one of the most important factors in strengthening the leadership role of the CPSU in the life of developed socialist society."(\*\*)

The Leninist style--according to K.U. Chernenko--is absolutely not the embodiment of general approaches and principles that are to be applied to every set of circumstances encountered in life. It is alien to formalism and dogmatism. "The Leninist style is the synthesis of the most important and constantly developing means, forms and methods employed in the activities of the party and state"(p 163).

This style consists mainly of the following: confidence in and loyalty to the cause of communism; a scientific attitude in one's work; unity between theory and practice, between revolutionary spirit and resourcefulness, between democracy and relations with the masses, between collective leadership and individual responsibility, between inspection and control, between self-criticism and criticism...

These factors, which are related to one another in a dialectical way, combine to form an entity. If one of these factors is lacking, the others are affected and the result is mistakes in leadership.

K.U. Chernenko states that communist confidence, that "conscious adherence to the communist ideology, the principles of the party when evaluating each phenomenon and performing each task are the most fundamental demands of the



Leninist workstyle of the party and state apparatus"(p 165). "Communist confidence is conscious loyalty to the thinking of scientific communism"(p 175). "Ideological consciousness means consistency between principles and morals, between confidence and activities, between words and actions"(p 175-176).

A scientific attitude--as the author states--is one of the most basic elements of the Leninist style. A scientific attitude means possessing deep, comprehensive knowledge of one's work; knowing and being able to creatively apply the laws of development of society; being able to encompass all pertinent factors while determining those that are fundamental, those that are of primary importance... K.U. Chernenko writes: "One of the most important sources of strength and victory is thorough knowledge of the characteristics and unique aspects of every stage of history through which Soviet society has passed and the creative application of this knowledge for the purpose of discovering correct forms through which the party can fulfill its leadership role and discovering suitable measures and methods for leading socialist construction"(pp 195-196).

Operating as a collective is the highest principle in the leadership provided by the party. It not only insures that the decisions made by leaders are accurate, but also insures the correct implementation of these decisions. Collective leadership within the work of the party and state stems from the principle of democratic centralism. Democracy and centralism constitute an entity. Were the party to be built only on the basis of the principle of centralism, it would face the danger of falling into factionalism and becoming a rigid organization. However, democracy without centralism leads to a loose organization and makes it impossible to lead the masses. K.U. Chernenko concludes that what is needed in order for the apparatus to operate successfully is to gather the opinions of the collective and tap its spirit of initiative and creativity: "Leaders on all levels can only acquire prestige when they listen to different viewpoints, even if these viewpoints are not consistent with their own"(p 261).

Being organized and effective are also important factors in the Leninist workstyle of the party and state apparatus. K.U. Chernenko writes: "It is the factor of organization that plays the salient role in bringing socialism from the realm of theory into the realm of practice"(p 272) and "under present conditions, teaching Leninist effectiveness is truly one of the most important means for achieving the successful implementation of the plans for communist construction"(p 273).

The essence of effectiveness lies in consistency between what one says and what one does. A correct resolution lays the groundwork for success but cannot, of itself, change the situation. Once a resolution has been adopted, steadfast and patient efforts must be made in the struggle to achieve the targets that have been set and there must be consistency between words and actions. K.U. Chernenko points out: "Current leadership and management standards demand that every effort be made to remove from our practical efforts the gap that exists between words and actions, the practice of formulating empty plans, red tape, the habit of holding meetings that are nothing more than an excuse for a drinking spree and the long-winded debate

of matters concerning which clear conclusion have already been reached. Allocating as much time as possible for organizational and political work is one of the most important tasks of the agencies of the party"(pp 298-299).

Control and inspection of implementation are an indispensable requirement of the Leninist style. The author writes: "Control and inspection of implementation have become one of the most effective means by which the policies of the party are implemented, cadres are educated and the practice of socialist democracy is broadened. There is every basis for stating that, today, how well implementation is controlled and inspected is the day to day standard against which the efficiency and quality of work of the various party committee echelons, the apparatus of these echelons and all of our cadres are measured"(p 310).

At the heart of inspections is the inspection of the implementation of resolutions at the places where these resolutions must be implemented. Moreover, inspection work should not be viewed as merely designed to reflect success or failure, rather, inspections must, above everything else, inspire and encourage efforts to overcome difficulties so that high results can be achieved.

Control and inspection work demand an objective approach, that is, demand that attention be given to both shortcomings and achievements, to both the opinions of the persons being inspected and the opinions of the person conducting the inspection... Inspections must be conducted on a routine basis and by flexible methods. Inspections should not be conducted only when a failure has occurred. The persons who must be inspected are backward persons as well as progressive persons, persons who have failed as well as persons who have achieved success. Only in this way can inspection and control work truly be effective.

Another requirement of the Leninist style is "to rely upon the masses, to listen to the opinions of the masses." "To the party of Lenin, establishing stronger ties with the masses outside the party, with all workers is never just a temporary, tactical guideline, but a strategic political line in the nature of a principle. This line is based on one of the most important viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism: the people, with their revolutionary energies, revolutionary creativity and revolutionary initiative, are the deciding force in and the principle architects of socialist and communist construction"(pp 350-351).

From the realities of the socialist revolution, K.U. Chernenko draws the following conclusion: "The unshakeable unity between the party and the people is the most important guarantee of the improvement and stability of developed socialist society"(p 352).

The basic organizations of the party play a key role in establishing stronger ties between the party and the masses because they are in constant contact with the masses, understand their thoughts and aspirations and, at the same time, are the ones who explain the policies of the party to the masses and mobilize them to implement these policies.



Not permitted as part of the relations with the masses is an attitude of "feeling sorry for" or ingratiating oneself with the masses, rather, "the masses must be led forward behind their enlightened vanguard unit"(p 365).

To strengthen the ties between the party and masses, it is necessary, as the author states, to practice true democracy, listen to the opinions of the masses and publicly report on the situation to them.

Criticism and self-criticism are distinctive, indispensable features of the Leninist workstyle. The practice of criticism and self-criticism is an extremely important ethical, ideological and political principle to communists; is a strong weapon in recognizing and transforming reality in order to strengthen the discipline of the party and state, correct onesided points of view and correct shortcomings and mistakes; is an important way for the masses to truly participate in the management of the state and society.

The most valuable aspect of criticism lies in the honesty and objectivity with which it is offered, in the social significance of the matters raised. Consequently, it is necessary to oppose those who are always painting a rosy picture as well as those who are inclined to find things wrong with achievements that have been recorded.

"The basis underlying the development of the practice of criticism and self-criticism is unconditional adherence to the standards of party life elaborated by Lenin. Being afraid to publicly raise pressing issues of social significance for debate, a tendency to treat in a form for form's sake manner or evade problems that have not been resolved and difficult problems and concealing shortcomings and real difficulties are inconsistent with Lenin's standards on party life"(p 424).

The attitude of the person who is offering criticism as well as that of the person being criticized are important matters and are discussed in detail by the author in this section of the book. He says that "consciously practicing self-criticism, being strict with oneself, accepting the criticism of others and giving attention to and rectifying the shortcomings pointed out by others in one's work are normal and natural practices of any leader of the party, government or economic organization if this person's development is to continue"(p 416). And, "when criticizing someone else, one should not forget to first rectify one's own shortcomings"(p 426). K. U. Chernenko also emphasizes: "We can in no way tolerate sinister demagoguery or finding fault with others as substitutes for criticism"(p 430). Criticism must "be direct and open, be bold and based in principle...and not be based on social etiquette or petty considerations"; "the criticism offered must be directed toward a specific person or persons and must be practical and constructive in nature"(p 429).

The author also criticizes the attitude of accepting criticism in a form for form's sake manner and states that "of primary importance in criticism and self-criticism is the achievement of a result, an effect and a readiness to immediately turn one's efforts to rectifying mistakes and shortcomings"(p 427). In particular, the author sharply criticizes the practice of suppressing criticism and retaliating against persons who voice criticism. He

calls for very determined efforts to combat every attempt to retaliate against persons who voice criticism and states: "The more they are based in principle, the more constructive criticism and self-criticism are, the more quickly we will record new victories in communist construction"(p 435).

#### 4. The Economy--the Primary Field of Activity

K.U. Chernenko devotes a major portion of his book to discussing the activities of the party in economic construction.

The author states: "Leading the national economy has always been and continues to be the main aspect of all activities of the party and state"(p 457).

Economic leadership encompasses very many tasks, among which, as the author states, "the most important in guaranteeing success in every stage of communist construction is the task of formulating a correct strategy and guidelines for developing the economy and its individual sectors based on the requirements of the stage, the rising needs of society and existing sources of materials and material capabilities"(p 458).

Heightening the influence of the party and improving the leadership provided by the party are directly related to one of the central issues raised by the realities of socialist construction, namely, the reciprocal relations between the agencies of the party and state management and economic management organizations.

This issue was first raised during the days following the October Revolution. V.I. Lenin frequently stressed the political harm caused by the elitist attitude that the party can lead society directly without need for other organizations of workers. The 8th Congress of the Communist Party (b) of Russia, which was held under the leadership of V.I. Lenin, pointed out: we absolutely must not confuse the function of the party collective with the function of the state organizations, that is, the soviets.

Today, the issue of clearly defining the boundary between party organizations and economic organizations is an issue of even greater importance. K.U. Chernenko asserts that as society develops, the party, the agencies of the party, must give even more attention to formulating and adjusting the strategy for the development of society, to defining the main tasks of the state agencies. "As the agency that provides political leadership, it is the task of every party committee to determine from among the myriad of jobs and issues faced those that are of greatest importance, those that offer the best prospects... At the same time, like a talented orchestra leader, the agencies of the party have the task of insuring that all government agencies, economic agencies and other agencies on the central and local levels coordinate their activities with one another. Working with cadres, especially with the leaders of these agencies, on a daily basis and with professional expertise, tapping the activism of the communists working within these agencies, insuring that all individual responsibilities are fulfilled and conducting control work on a regular basis--these constitute the sure and constant path to success"(p 501).

"The present strengthening of the party's leadership of economic development in no way means less of a role for economic leaders and management agencies. To the contrary, while thoroughly establishing the workstyle of the party in all areas of the national economy, the CPSU has been making every effort to very clearly define the functions of the party agencies, state agencies and economic agencies so that every agency, as we say, knows how to mobilize its forces and has the broadest possible scope within which to search for ways to be creative"(pp 501-502).

He criticizes a number of leaders who push economic problems off onto party agencies in order to evade their own responsibility and conceal their incompetency. He also criticizes a number of party committee members who, instead of fulfilling their duties, have turned into suppliers, supervisors, coordinators...

The author emphasizes that the problems of economic leadership are not only economic problems, but also political problems, problems of the party"(p 513). Consequently, the most important principle, the foremost and permanent task of the party committee echelons are to mobilize the creative potential of each person and raise the consciousness and zeal of the masses.

"While mobilizing the masses to implement the political line, the party must endeavor to achieve its ends not through the strength of authority, not through orders, but through the persuasion, through the strength of examples set by each and every communist, through constant concern for the political education of each person. Of importance is the need to combine theoretical work, ideological work, political education, organizational work and economic work as one and create within every enterprise and every collective a socio-political atmosphere that makes people want to work better, more efficiently, more productively"(p 514).

Containing as it does a wealth of information, only a few of the most important aspects of which can be briefly discussed in a journal article, K.U. Chernenko's work is truly a project of major theoretical and practical value. It not only serves to guide the work of the party and state apparatus of the Soviet Union, but also provides us with valuable experiences.

It can be said that the entire work as well as each section of the book and each argument made by the author is based in science, based on Lenin's theories concerning the new style party, the proletarian dictatorship state, the workstyle of the party and the principles that underlie party activities.

These theoretical arguments are a summary of the great wealth of practical activities of the CPSU, especially in the course of building developed socialist society.

On the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and from the realities of the country, the author draws many theoretical conclusions of significance in guiding all of the activities involved in building the party and state.

This work is also a model of the militancy of the proletariat. The author devotes many pages to praising units and localities that have recorded good

experiences in the activities of the party and state apparatus; at the same time, he harshly criticizes everything that reflects deviation from or the abandonment of the principles of the party. The author's praise as well as his criticism are very relevant and specific and very helpful in developing upon strongpoints and discovering, recognizing and correcting shortcomings.

Through this work, we see even more clearly that the CPSU was the party that opened the way for the socialist revolution and socialist construction and also the way for building and strengthening the new style party of the proletariat in the stage of struggle for political power as well as the stage of socialist construction, is the party that has given the most by way of valuable lessons in theory as well as practical experiences to the world revolution.

The lessons presented in this work are of great value to us in building the mechanism "the party leads, the laboring people exercise collective ownership and the state manages" as proposed by our party.

#### FOOTNOTES

\* The passages in quotation marks followed by page numbers within this article are excerpts from the book "Some Matters Concerning the Work of the Party and State Apparatus" by K.U. Chernenko, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1984.

\*\* K.U. Chernenko: "Some Matters Concerning the Work of the Party and State Apparatus," Russian version, p 445.

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PROPERLY IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY OF ASSIGNING BUDGET MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE LOCALITIES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 54-62

[Article by Chu Tam Thuc]

[Text] The Need To Improve the Assignment of Budget Management Responsibilities to the Localities

The resolution of the 5th Plenum of the 5th Party Central Committee stressed the need to "immediately establish a division of budget responsibilities between the central and local levels, one that insures the revenue sources of the central level while increasing the revenue sources of local budgets and provides the various levels and economic-technical sectors with control over their budgets. At the same time, we must establish uniform financial management procedures and emphasize financial discipline on all levels, within all sectors and at all basic units." In keeping with the spirit of this resolution, it is necessary to establish a proper division of management responsibilities and fully implement the principle of democratic centralism under guidelines that provide for appropriate centralization on the central level while strongly increasing the responsibility and independence of the localities and combating bureaucratic centralism and subsidization, combating localism and departmentalism.

In 1967, we began to assign budget management responsibilities to the state government on the provincial level. In 1978, this policy was amended and revised. At the same time, we expanded the assignment of management responsibilities to the districts. The implementation of this policy has had the effect of further increasing the role and responsibility of the state government on the provincial and district levels in economic-financial management within the locality; at the same time, it has stimulated and encouraged positive steps by the localities to build the economy, carry out cultural development and look after the living conditions of the people.

Besides the results that have been achieved, many problems still exist in the assignment of budget management responsibilities because of shortcomings and mistakes in organizing the implementation of this policy and because the policy itself has flaws that must be corrected.

To begin with, the principle of democratic centralism, a fundamental principle of socialist economic management, is not being strictly observed.

On the one hand, the centralism and unity of the state financial system are not being maintained. In the recent past, some sectors and localities have enacted their own regulations on revenues and expenditures that conflict with the general procedures and policies of the state. Many places still maintain illegal funds outside the budget and outside the bank. Especially serious is the fact that some localities have retained revenues of the central budget for use by the locality. As a result, the central budget is always in a passive position, is always in urgent need of revenues, is always a deficit budget.

On the other hand, the initiative and creativity of the local governments are not being tapped and bureaucratic centralism is being corrected slowly. Since 1978, many changes have occurred in the economic situation, especially since 1981 following the adoption of the new system of prices and the establishment within the budget of funds to compensate for the prices of goods supplied to cadres, manual workers, civil servants and the armed forces and there have also been many changes in the financial situation but the procedures, policies, quotas and standards concerning financial revenues and expenditures have been amended or revised slowly, as a result of which difficulties have been created for localities and loopholes have opened that have led to haphazard compliance. Although the price structure has been changed and price compensation funds supplied to local budgets have been increased, the ratio among the various sources of revenue has not been revised in a timely manner and the central level still subsidizes local budgets at a high rate, at the rate of roughly one-third of total local budget expenditures. This situation has made it impossible for localities to take the initiative in many different areas and created an attitude of waiting for and relying upon the central level.

To correct the above weaknesses and help to bring about the successful implementation of party resolutions, it is necessary to improve the assignment of budget management responsibilities to the localities with a view toward meeting the following requirements:

1. Insuring that only the central level manages financial revenue and expenditure policies and procedures and providing the state budget with all the revenue sources required to meet the important needs of the entire country.

2. Heightening the responsibility of the various levels of local government (provincial, municipal, special zone, district, ward, precinct, village and subward) in economic-cultural development and in mobilizing revenue sources within their territory while giving the locality the independence to formulate and implement the local budget revenue and expenditure plan in a way that promotes local economic development and improves the material and cultural lives of the local people.

## The Changes in the Policy of Assigning Budget Management Responsibilities to the Localities

To meet the above requirements, the policy of assigning budget management responsibilities must be revised in the following main areas:

--The division of expenditure responsibilities between the central budget and the local budgets:

The assignment of budget management responsibilities to the localities mainly entails assigning responsibilities to the localities regarding the scope of local budget expenditures and the specific expenditures to be made by the locality. Which budget expenditures should be made by the central level and which by the local level must be determined on the basis of the division of economic management and state management responsibilities. The general guidelines governing this division of responsibilities are: "The central level continues to provide centralized, unified leadership of the entire national economy through a national plan that encompasses the major balances and primary norms to be met, through the adoption of major policies and basic standards regarding production as well as consumption and through the distribution of materials and capital. The central economy consists of those key sectors that serve to lead and direct the economy of the entire country. Every locality must independently manage and build its economy on the basis of the general line, policies, guidelines and plans of the central level. The economy of each locality is an integral part of the national economy as well as a balanced and rational system that exists within the scope of the locality.(1)

On the basis of these guidelines, the central budget has the tasks of providing all national capital construction funds for the creation of the material-technical bases of socialism and a new economic framework, one structured by sector and locality; making all expenditures on national defense and security; supplying all funds for diplomatic activity, aid and the repayment of debts to foreign countries; and supplying capital and operating funds to the basic production-business units and the administrative agencies and work units that are directly managed by the central level. The local budget has the tasks of allocating capital and funds to the enterprises, administrative agencies and work units that are directly managed by the local government.

Within the new division of responsibilities, two expenditure items, namely, investments in national capital construction under the state plan and the funding of price compensation for the goods supplied to the cadres, manual workers and civil servants of the agencies and enterprises of the central level who live and work within the locality and to the armed forces, have been restructured and placed within the central budget.

Investments in capital construction play the decisive role in the scale, technical level and rate of development, in the balance of the entire national economy and constitute a large percentage of total state budget expenditures. However, our use of the capital invested in capital construction is, generally speaking, still marked by waste and inefficiency. Although we have limited



materials and capital, we have spread them out over many different projects. The supply of materials and capital, which is already very tight, has been made even tighter by the fact that many localities and sectors have scheduled projects outside the plan on their own. This situation has led to poor results: construction time drags on, the volume of unfinished construction work is steadily mounting and projects are put into production, into use slowly. The coefficient of fixed assets in use is low and projects are not completed in a well coordinated manner, as a result of which they cannot be used. When adequate materials are not available for projects outside the plan, materials are taken from projects to be constructed under the plan, thereby slowing the construction of key state projects and affecting efforts to meet the targets of the national economic plan.

One reality we face is that our needs for capital to invest in capital construction are very large; however, we cannot ignore another stark reality, namely, that the economy is not yet providing for capital formation. The capital that we invest in capital construction comes primarily from loans and aid but these sources, too, are gradually declining. Debts that we incurred in previous years are now due for repayment. The equipment and materials needed for capital construction are in short supply and are obtained mainly through imports.

In view of this situation, it is necessary to restructure our investments in capital construction along the following lines: "Concentrating our capital on projects of vital importance, key sectors and the most important products while being determined to stop the practice of decentralizing and uniformly distributing our capital over many different construction projects. Investments must be well coordinated and designed mainly to develop existing production capacity."(2)

To implement the above policy, it is necessary, on the one hand, to improve capital allocation and loan procedures for investments in capital construction; on the other hand, there must be a restructuring of expenditures on capital construction between the central budget and the local budgets. According to resolution number 138/HDBT, the central budget will henceforth assume the responsibility for all capital invested in capital construction and centralize this capital in order to create the material-technical base of socialism and a new economic framework, one structured by sector and locality. On this basis, the central level will control the formation of the total capital invested in capital construction in a manner consistent with the availability of labor, materials and capital within the national economy during each planning period. Through the centralized distribution of investment capital among the various sectors and localities, a new economic structure will gradually be formed, one that insures that the main targets of the national economy are met while stimulating the balanced and rational development of the various regions of the country. However, the needs of the localities are very diverse and the capabilities and potentials of the local economies are many. In order to encourage the localities to take positive steps to develop local sources of revenue and utilize their budget capital in an economical manner, the new policy also permits the localities to use the capital formed through local economic development and the capital resulting from increased revenues and reduced expenditures. In addition, the localities

are also permitted to use surplus funds in the local budget, capital contributed by the people under the guideline "the state and the people working together," capital borrowed from the bank, capital contributed by state-operated enterprises (central and local) through welfare funds and revenues from the construction lottery for investment in the construction of projects that directly serve specific needs of the locality for which the capital distribution plan of the central level does not fully provide. Of course, these projects must be recorded within the state plan, the materials required for them and material availability must be in balance and all sources of capital must be reflected within the budget.

Payments to compensate for the prices of goods supplied to cadres, manual workers, civil servants and the armed forces are a major item within the state budget. In mid-1981, together with the promulgation of the new system of prices and the adoption of regulations defining the products to be supplied, the persons to whom they are to be supplied and supply standards, the state officially established an account within the state budget from which to pay compensation for the prices of goods supplied to these persons. Within the context of wages not being improved and prices on the market continuing to fluctuate, the state has still managed to stabilize the prices of some of the essential goods supplied to cadres, manual workers, civil servants, the armed forces, persons eligible for products under the various policies that have been adopted and persons who have economic ties to the state with a view toward maintaining the real income of the laborer. Retail commerce agencies are compensated for the difference between base prices and supply prices by funds from the state budget. Since 1981, expenditures to compensate for the prices of supplied goods (minus the compensation paid to members of the armed forces) have come from the local budgets. If the provincial, municipal or special zone budgets (hereafter abbreviated as the provincial budget) lack sufficient funds to make price compensation payments or can only provide for a portion of these payments, the funds needed to make up the deficit are transferred from the central budget to the local budget so that expenditure needs can be met for the entire year. This method of budgeting places the localities in a very passive position, some localities are able to make these compensation payments on their own but still rely upon the central budget. During the three years from 1981 to 1983, due to changes in the structure of the sources of goods resulting from the decline in imports, the stabilization of the quantity of products procured under obligations, the failure to meet plans on the procurement of goods under two-way contracts due to shortages of trade goods, the rise in the volume of goods procured at incentive prices and so forth, plus weaknesses in management, the base prices of supplied goods have risen rapidly, as a result of which budget expenditures on price compensation have also risen and exceed the capabilities of local budgets.

To restructure the price compensation account with the budget and enable the local governments to take the initiative in budgeting their expenditures, the new policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities gives the central budget responsibility for compensating for the prices of goods supplied to those cadres, manual workers, civil servants and dependents who are under the management of the central level. Under the new regulations, the method by which these expenditures are computed and the allocation and management of price compensation expenditure funds remain, generally

speaking, unchanged. The only difference here is that a clear division has been established concerning the sources of capital used to make price compensation payments between the central budget and the local budget.

--The revenue sources of the local budget and the mechanism by which these revenue sources are formed:

The division of revenue sources between the central budget and the local budget must be consistent with the expenditure requirements assigned under the state budget to each level. In keeping with this spirit, the majority of the basic, stable and important revenue accounts of a national nature must be concentrated within the central budget.

All budget revenue sources within the locality are common revenue sources of the state budget. On the basis of the general requirements of the locality and the nature of each type revenue, the state leaves behind for the local budget the percentage of revenues needed to insure the performance of the tasks established under the locality's economic, cultural and social development plans.

Under the new policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities, the revenue accounts of the local budget consist of three types: general revenue accounts, which are based on a fixed rate that uniformly applies to all provinces; supplementary regulated revenue accounts that apply to provinces that have exhausted their general revenues but are still unable to meet the expenditure needs required by the state; and supplementary regulated revenue rates that apply only to four revenue accounts (industrial-commercial taxes, agricultural taxes, state-operated revenues and the profits of local state-operated enterprises), which vary from province to province, the maximum rate being 100 percent, and are stabilized, currently for the 2 years 1984 and 1985. Subsidies from the central budget are only applied in special cases when the province has received the maximum rate of supplementary regulated revenues but is still unable to balance its budget. These subsidies are revised once each year and the locality is notified at the start of each year as to whether or not a subsidy will be received.

Under this arrangement of revenue sources, some provinces in which agriculture and industry are relatively well developed can balance their budgets on their own through general revenues. A number of other provinces require a higher rate of supplementary revenue to balance budget revenues and expenditures. On the momentum of local economic development, the supplementary revenue rate can decline and eventually not be necessary at all. Only in a number of special cases, mainly in the sparsely populated mountain provinces where the material-technical bases needed to develop the potentials of the locality are still underdeveloped, are subsidies from the central budget needed. Thus, while subsidization continues, its scope has been reduced and it will eventually be eliminated.

Henceforth, the revenues of the local budget are to be determined not on the basis of expenditure totals established in advance by the central level, but on the basis of the revenues of the state budget within the locality and the regulated rates at which funds are allocated to the locality from each revenue

account. If the locality creates increasingly large sources of revenue and develops state revenue sources within the locality well, the percentage of revenues that is allocated to the local budget rises and expenditure needs can be met better. Moreover, if the locality exceeds its plan quotas on revenues in the forms of taxes, profits and state-operated revenues, it receives a bonus of 30 to 50 percent of the amount by which the plan on the payment of revenues for inclusion in the central budget is exceeded in addition to the funds allocated to the local budget on the basis of the percentage set for each revenue account. Thus, the new policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities has the effect of encouraging greater responsibility and heightening the responsibility on the part of local governments in developing revenue sources well and independently planning spending in a manner consistent with the socio-economic development tasks that are assigned, thereby satisfying vital interests of the locality while insuring that the common interests of the entire country are satisfied.

To increase the responsibility of the local governments in local economic development, open local sources of revenue and gradually reduce the dependency upon subsidies from the central level, the regulated rates at which funds are provided for the local budget are based on the following principle: the local budget receives the larger portion of those revenue accounts that are funded from within the local economy; on the other hand, the local budget is further supplemented by a number of new revenue sources, such as revenues from the delivery of agricultural products, forest management revenues, revenue in the form of 20 percent of the welfare funds of central state-operated enterprises...

Agricultural product delivery revenues are a revenue account of the local budget that has been created to provide those localities that specialize in agriculture, forestry, fishing or salt production with a stable source of revenue and encourage all localities to increase the production, procurement and delivery of products for domestic consumption and exportation. This revenue account is computed as a percentage (%) of the directed procurement price of the state.

In essence, this is an adjusted revenue account but it does serve to provide clear incentive. In contrast to previous revenue incentives regarding the delivery of agricultural and food products to the central level, this new revenue account applies to all agricultural, forestry, marine and aquatic products (not only pork, tobacco, coffee and cinnamon as was the case before) and is not limited to the products that are delivered to the central level, but applies to all products delivered to the upper level (the central level, provincial level and district level). Unlike previously, revenues from the delivery of agricultural products are not added to the product delivery price but supplied through the budget with the procurement unit making payment to the local budget at the place from which the products are delivered. Therefore, within the provincial and district budgets, two accounts are simultaneously formed, an account for revenues from the delivery of agricultural products and an account for expenditures on the delivery of agricultural products. The rate at which revenues are earned from the delivery of agricultural products is a uniform rate applied to all types of

products and all budgetary levels. Each budgetary level (provincial, district and village) receives 5 percent of the value (as reflected by the directed price) of the products delivered to the upper level. The provincial budget earns an additional 5 percent for products delivered to the central level for exportation. A bonus of 10 percent of the value of the products delivered is earned for products that exceed the plan (or are outside the plan) on the delivery of products to the central level.

Forest management revenues: under previous regulations, 10 percent of the funds set aside for forest management was allocated to the local budgets in the form of forestry revenues while 90 percent was deposited in the "forest management fund" managed and distributed by the Ministry of Forestry to the central and local forestry units for afforestation, the repair of forests and forest conservation. To correct the weaknesses inherent in the centralized management of forest management funds under previous regulations, the central level will henceforth turn over forest management funds to the localities to be used for the purposes of afforestation and the repair, improvement, management and conservation of forests with a view toward encouraging the mountain localities to make every effort to develop and use forest resources well while strengthening the management of and centralizing local revenue sources so that the localities can take greater initiative in arranging their budgets.

Under the new policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities, the local budget receives 20 percent of the welfare funds of the central state-operated enterprises located within the locality. This is a supplemental revenue source of the local budget, the purpose of which is to build better public welfare projects supporting the material and cultural lives of the cadres, manual workers and civil servants of the central agencies and enterprises and their families who live within the locality. This regulation officially establishes the obligation of the central state-operated enterprises to contribute financially to the locality and corrects the problem of many enterprises not concerning themselves with improving the natural and social conditions that exist within the area in which it operates as well as the problem of many localities requesting that central state-operated enterprises make payments to the budget that are violations of general state policy.

--The district and village budgets:

The implementation of the policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities to the districts in accordance with resolution 108/CP dated 13 May 1978 has had the effect of accelerating the process of the development of the districts into agro-industrial economic units, into a level of state government that manages a comprehensive plan and has its own budget. At the same time, the advances that have been made in building the districts and the improvements that have been made in the assignment of economic and cultural management responsibilities to the districts also demand that the assignment of budget management responsibilities be improved accordingly.

To increase the financial and budgetary independence of the districts, it is necessary to re-examine the expenditure requirements and revenue sources of



the district budget and revise and supplement a number of necessary revenue and expenditure accounts; on the other hand, the mechanism by which revenue sources are formed must be redefined in order to establish a position of independence for the districts.

Generally speaking, the division of budget management responsibilities between the province and the district is the same as the division of responsibilities between the central level and the locality presented above. Of utmost importance is the need for the province, on the basis of the scope of its own budget and the actual situation surrounding the assignment of economic and cultural management responsibilities to the district, to determine the expenditure requirements of the district and, on this basis, provide revenue sources for the district budget. One basic change in the policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities to the district is a change in the mechanism by which revenue sources are formed. District budget revenue sources also include general revenue accounts, supplemental regulated revenue accounts, subsidies from the provincial budget and capital distributed for capital construction by the province. In addition to revenues from taxes and revenues from the delivery of agricultural products, which are earned at a uniform rate set by the central level for all district, other revenue accounts (the percentages allocated to the district) are determined by the province. The province must set these regulated rates in such a way that the expenditures which the district is required to make are funded by corresponding revenue sources and thus reduce the need for subsidies to balance the district budget to the lowest possible level. General revenue rates will not change annually as they previously did but are stabilized until 1985.

Previously, the district budget was essentially only a district level budget because it did not encompass the village budget. Under the new regulations, the district budget is a part of the provincial budget, the village budget is a part of the district budget and the entire budget of the locality (the province, districts and villages) is a part of the state budget. Thus, the district budget consists of the district level budget and the budgets of the district's villages. On the basis of the revenue sources stipulated for it by the upper level, the people's committee and people's council of the district draft the district budget and apportion part of it to the village budgets at rates set by the district (minus agricultural taxes, the salt tax, the slaughtering tax and the other types of industrial and commercial taxes collected within the village and minus the revenues from the delivery of agricultural products as set by the central level) with a view toward meeting the expenditure requirements assigned to the village government. However, because of the complex nature of the village budget and the need for time to improve village budget bookkeeping, statistical work and management in accordance with the budget management procedures of the state, the incorporation of the village budget within the state budget system must be carried out gradually. In the immediate future, it is necessary to incorporate within the state budget estimate and balance a number of revenue and expenditure accounts set by the state for the village budget.



## Achieving Stronger Financial Discipline and Successfully Making the Changes in the Policy on the Assignment of Budget Management Responsibilities

To support the successful implementation of the resolution of the 5th Party Congress and the resolutions of the subsequent party plenums, all sectors and levels must gain a thorough understanding of and fully implement Council of Ministers Resolution Number 138/HDBT dated 19 November 1983 on the assignment of budget management responsibilities to the localities.

The redefining of the expenditure requirements and the scope of expenditures of the local budgets and the improvement of the mechanism by which the revenue sources of the local budget are formed have increased the financial and budgetary independence of the local governments. The localities have the authority to arrange their expenditure accounts on the basis of revenue capabilities of the local budget. With the regulated rates set previously, the revenues of the local budget are closely tied to the formation of state revenue sources within the locality. Therefore, in the final analysis, the extent to which the expenditure needs of the local budget are met depends primarily upon the productivity, quality and efficiency of operation of the enterprises and basic economic units (central and local) located within the locality. If the various levels of local government strengthen their management of subordinate enterprises and economic organizations, actively participate in the production, business and financial management of the central enterprises located within their territory and stimulate the comprehensive and steady development of the economy within their territory, they can balance their budgets by means of general revenue sources. As more and more localities manage to balance their budgets, the central level will be better able to centralize the capital required to meet the common needs of the entire country. Examined from this perspective, the assignment of budget management responsibilities, rather than weakening, actually has the impact of strengthening the centralism and unity of the socialist state financial system.

The fact that the central level does not set the total level of local budget expenditures and the fact that it has stabilized the regulated rates lay the groundwork for the localities to thoroughly implement the guideline for a positive budget balance: increasing their revenues in order to meet expenditures. If the localities organize and utilize the various sources of state revenue within their territories well, local budget revenues will increase and, as a result, expenditure needs will be met better.

The new sources of revenue that have been added to the local budget are sources that are closely tied to local economic potentials, consequently, their effect is to encourage the localities to fully develop their strengths, open more and more local revenue sources and gradually decrease their dependency upon subsidies from the central level.

In conjunction with increasing their independence, it is also necessary to develop the spirit of self-assumed responsibility of the various levels of local government in balancing their budgets. If the localities fail to meet local budget revenue requirements, they must adjust their expenditure accounts in order to achieve a balanced budget. If a balance cannot be achieved, they

must make use of the localities' financial reserves. Only in truly special cases resulting from objective causes and after the locality has adjusted its expenditures and exhausted its financial reserves and is still not able to balance its budget will the central level grant it a loan or subsidy.

Making the above mentioned changes in the assignment of budget management responsibilities will surely help to create a dynamic management system, one suited to the present situation, one capable of eliminating bureaucratic centralism, conservatism, inaction and sweeping subsidies while heightening the responsibility and broadening the independence of the local governments in economic and cultural development and in arranging their budgets.

Thus, under the new policy on the assignment of management responsibilities, authority and responsibility are increased and the sense of collective ownership is heightened on each level, thereby making it possible to strengthen the state financial system and meet construction needs and the everyday needs of our people better with each passing day in a spirit of self-reliance.

The first prerequisites to insuring that the new changes in the policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities are thoroughly enacted are to correctly observe the principle of democratic centralism and maintain firm financial discipline. With a large degree of management responsibility having been assigned to the localities, lax financial discipline will lead to disorder, localism and departmentalism and harm the planned and balanced development of the entire national economy.

The principle of centralism and unity of the socialist financial system demands that every revenue and expenditure account, from the central to the local levels, be fully, promptly and accurately reflected within the budget and comply with the uniform policies, procedures, quotas and standards set by the central level. The central level does not control the total expenditures made from the local budget and the province has the authority to arrange its expenditure accounts in a manner consistent with revenue capabilities and the economic, cultural and social development needs of its locality. This in no way means that the locality is permitted to adopt revenue and expenditure policies and standards that conflict with the policies and standards of the state, establish and maintain illegal funds outside the budget or fail to implement the policy on submitting full reports to the central level.

To achieve stronger financial discipline, the responsible agencies must draft new financial policies and procedures or promptly revise their financial policies and procedures so that they are consistent with the circumstances and characteristics of our country in the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism. The people's committees on the various levels must urgently rearrange their budgets (for themselves and the lower level) to bring them in line with the new regulations and bring the revenues of the local budget in line with the new rates that went into effect on 1 January 1984.

The state budget is a single entity. All state financial agencies, from the central to the provincial, district and village levels, have the responsibility of concerning themselves with the entire state budget. They

must provide for stronger financial auditing and control in all sectors and levels and insure full compliance with financial discipline from top to bottom.

Gaining a thorough understanding of and fully complying with the resolution on the improvement of the policy on the assignment of budget management responsibilities to the localities and endeavoring to bring about steady improvements in state financial management and the management of the state budget are practical ways to support the implementation of the positive national financial policy, a policy consistent with the present stage, that was set forth by the 5th Congress of the Party.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Le Duan: "Duoi la co ve vang cua Dang, vi doc lap, tu do, vi chu nghia xa hoi tien len gianh nhung thang loi moi,"[Advancing Under the Glorious Banner of the Party To Win New Victories for Independence, Freedom and Socialism], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 120.
2. The Proceedings of the 5th Congress, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, Volume II, p 54.

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## GRADUALLY IMPROVING THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WITHIN THE MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT CORPORATION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 63-68

[Article by Tran Vo Man]

[Text] Prior to 1980, despite very large investments by the state, the exportation of marine products failed to meet the plan every year: compared to 1966, the value of marine product exports in 1977 equalled 88.48 percent; 1978: 84.06 percent; 1979: 77.88 percent; and at the end of 1980, only 54.21 percent. The exportation of all three of the sector's primary products declined in volume also: in 1980, frozen shrimp exports fell to 50 percent, frozen fish exports to 47 percent and frozen squid exports to only 30 percent of what they were in 1976. Practically all marine product production and processing units were operating at a loss.

The situation described above was due to many causes, the most important of which was the fact that the exportation of marine products was not properly organized. A number of the specific policies regarding the export fishing industry were irrational. A satisfactory relationship had not been established among the economic interests of the state, the locality, the basic unit and the worker.

In early 1981, in order to stop the long decline that had taken place and gradually restore and increase the exportation of marine products, the state permitted the Marine Products Export Corporation of the Ministry of Marine Products to take a number of measures to improve its economic management system. Efforts to improve the corporation's economic management have focused on gradually eliminating bureaucratic management and subsidization and implementing socialist business management within marine product export activities in our country. Having spent 3 years (1981-1983) implementing the new policies and positions that have been adopted, having gained experience while working, we now boldly present some of the jobs that have been performed in the recent past.

1. Improving the Functions and Operations of the Marine Products Export Corporation, Reorganizing the Supply of Materials and the Procurement of Marine Products and Closely Tying Exports to Production

The Marine Products Export Corporation was formerly under the management of the Vietnam National Sea Products Export-Import Corporation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The main function of this agency is to procure marine products under plans for the marine product processing enterprises. While it was concerned with the status of the production and procurement of marine products and the supply of materials for production in the stages preceding the delivery of marine products to processing enterprises, this national corporation lacked the material conditions needed to help basic production units and localities overcome their difficulties. To correct this situation, the state instructed the Ministry of Marine Products to establish the Marine Products Export Corporation to fulfill new functions: representing the localities and basic production units in organizing exports and representing the state in planning the production and exportation of marine products, managing products, providing technical management and supplying materials for production. As a result of this organizational improvement, marine product export activities now closely tie the supplying of materials to the procurement of marine products for exportation thereby closely coordinating all aspects of production and exportation.

At present, the production materials that it obtains on its own and the imported technical materials it receives are distributed by the Marine Products Export Corporation directly to procurement units (usually through the marine product processing plants) and directly to those units that have sold marine products for exportation to the state. We have made a determined effort in our procurement activities to eliminate unnecessary intermediary levels and enable fishermen and production units to sell marine products directly to processing enterprises without going through procurement units of the provincial and district marine product corporations as they once did. Organizing the exportation of marine products in this way affords many advantages: first, it has eliminated many of the intermediary levels, in both the procurement of marine products as well as the supplying of materials for production, that existed under the old organizational system, a system characterized by bureaucracy and subsidization. It has reduced production and export time. Producers receive their supplies quickly and the materials they receive are coordinated and meet production requirements. Secondly, the state has been able to centralize the exportation of the primary marine products and has created the conditions for the localities and basic production units to come into contact with and gain an understanding of the requirements of the overseas market, meet the consumer requirements of customers and quickly expand their product markets. Thirdly, this method of organization has laid the groundwork for the establishment of cooperation and joint businesses (between processing enterprises and marine product production units) and economic ties (between the marine products sector and the localities and marine product production units), thereby stimulating the establishment of the new division of labor within marine product export activities. This is also one of the important prerequisites to the eventual establishment of federated enterprises or marine product harvesting, processing and exporting combines in the advance toward large-scale socialist production.

## 2. Obtaining the Necessary Supplies on Its Own by Increasing the Exportation of Marine Products Is of Decisive Significance in Dismantling the System of Subsidized Management and Unleashing Strong Economic Forces in the Exportation of Marine Products

In view of the fact that the state is only able to provide a limited supply of materials to the fishing industry, permitting the Marine Products Export Corporation to use the major portion of the foreign currency earned through the exportation of marine products to purchase the technical supplies needed for production is a positive step toward restoring and developing the production and exportation of marine products. This innovative approach was actually implemented by the Marine Products Export Corporation in April, 1981, when the state, through various documents, instructed us to gradually improve the economic management system within the exportation of marine products. Of the various documents issued by the state concerning the exportation of marine products, the one most deserving of attention is Office of the Premier Official Correspondence Number 2,311 (24 June 1981). This document permits the localities to use imported materials and goods and permits the Marine Products Export Corporation to use foreign currency earned through the exportation of marine products to purchase the balance of the technical materials needed and supply technical materials used in fishing to the localities and basic production units under ceilings that correspond to the quantity of marine products procured from them by the state for exportation. This has been one of the most basic factors in resolving management difficulties, accelerating the exportation of marine products and establishing good economic relations between the state and the localities and basic units that produce marine products for exportation in the recent past. The majority of the processing enterprises and fishing units that harvest marine products for exportation are now under the management of the localities. And, the total number of different marine products exported includes both marine products that are managed exclusive by the state and marine products of the localities. Therefore, this document has improved the plans assigned to the localities and closely tied the economic interests of the localities to the implementation of these plans. For example, when a locality meets its plan quota on the foreign currency earned through the exportation of the various types of marine products managed by the central level, the state only retains 30 percent of these earnings and returns 70 percent of the foreign currency earned to the localities in the form of imported materials and goods (if this plan quota is exceeded, the locality receives 90 percent of the additional foreign currency earned). If marine products that are not managed by the central level are sold to the state for exportation, the locality also receives 90 percent of the foreign currency earned (also in the form of imported materials and goods). With this foreign currency that the localities are authorized to use, the Marine Products Export Corporation has spent about 75 percent on the importation of means of production and 25 percent on consumer goods in order to establish a fund of materials and goods for supply under two-way contracts between the state and the localities, production units and fishermen engaged in the exportation of marine products. The prices of these materials and goods are import prices (plus importing costs). No profit of any kind is included in these prices. Therefore, localities have been given strong incentive to turn their attention toward and increase the exportation of marine products. In actuality, although the localities have



not spent all of the foreign currency that they are authorized to use on the export fishing industry, this industry has received regular investments in the recent past and developed better in all localities. Control of the market and the management of marine products within the localities are rather tight and more and more marine products are being sold to the state.

As regards laborers, the Marine Products Export Corporation has been providing a timely supply of products for sale in exchange for marine products, such as grain and means of production, and also supplying many consumer goods. As a result of establishing sources of capital, our corporation has been able to provide basic production units with all the raw materials, fuel and supplies needed to increase their production and business and thereby put a stop to the operating losses of past years. Although the export plan assigned by the state to the corporation has increased with each passing year (38 percent higher in 1982 than in 1981 and 122 percent higher in 1983 than in 1982, which also included an additional plan assigned by the state at the end of the year), the Marine Products Export Corporation has been able to meet and exceed its plan quotas as a result of the production and procurement of marine products being carried out well within the localities. It exceeded its plan by 15 percent in 1981, 22 percent in 1982 and 36 percent in 1983. And, if we take the value of the marine products exported in 1980 as 100, the value of exports rose to 136 in 1981, 197 in 1982 and 364 in 1983. These figures would be much higher if the products exported directly by the localities were included. These results show that under the new method of operation, significant progress has been made in the exportation of marine products over the past few years and in the right place compared to many previous years.

### 3. Effectively Controlling the Sources of Production Materials, Making Improvements to the Price Policy, Properly Implementing Two-Way Contracts Between the State and Fishermen and Accelerating the Procurement of Marine Products for Exportation

When subsidized management was being practiced, two way contracts were merely a matter of form because sources of materials were not being effectively controlled. The lack of materials to exchange for marine products in procurement activities, procurement prices that were too low to cover production costs and so forth caused the quantity of marine products being procured to steadily decline. Between 1976 and 1980, the quantity of marine products procured fell at an average annual rate of 15.6 percent. And, one freezer plant that has a capacity of 1 ton per day produced only 10 tons of exported fish during an entire year because it was unable to procure adequate marine products. Although the state was unable to procure marine products, the majority of supplies was still being sold under the plan at very low prices to production units. Moreover, in some basic production units and localities, these supplies were being resold.

To correct this situation, the state adjusted the prices of many types of supplies and marine products and began fully executing the two-way contracts between the state and production units and fishermen. The two-way contracts governing the procurement of marine products and the supplying of materials have been made more specific by the Marine Products Export Corporation. If a producer sells marine products to the state at directed prices, the state also

sells materials to the producer in exchange for marine products at directed prices and in accordance with established ceilings. Once they have fulfilled their contracts, producers can sell additional marine products to the state at negotiated prices, not at incentive prices as before. Of course, when fishermen sell marine products to the state at negotiated prices, the state also sells materials to fishermen at negotiated prices. And, these negotiated prices vary depending upon marine products prices on the free market during each period of time. During the past 3 years, as a result of material prices remaining relatively stable and the state raising marine product procurement prices to reasonable levels, relatively good results have been achieved in the procurement of marine products. The quantity of marine products procured has increased at the average rate of 13.4 percent compared to the state plan assigned to the corporation. These results prove the important role that economic policy plays within the system of economic levers and reflect the establishment of a correct relationship among the economic interests of the state, the collective and the laborer.

#### 4. Improving the Way Investments Are Made in Fishing Operations and the Cultivation of Marine Products, Achieving the Combined Strength of Every Piece of Fishing Equipment and Every Fishing Force and Creating Stable Sources of Marine Products for Exportation

In previous years, investments focused mainly on the procurement of large ships for shrimping and fishing far at sea. No attention was given to investing in or equipping with small, motorized and non-motorized boats. Consequently, marine product fishing operations produced limited results. Ever since the state gave it permission to obtain materials on its own, the Marine Products Export Corporation has been taking a rational, coordinated and selective approach to investments. On the one hand, the corporation has attached appropriate importance to importing parts for marine engines to restore production capacity; on the other hand, it has concentrated on re-equipping basic production units with small motorized and non-motorized boats with a view toward harvesting many species of marine products of high export value, such as shrimp, squid and so forth, better.

Along with the investments in and purchase of fishing equipment, investments made by the corporation in the investigation and study of fishing grounds and the improvement of the technology used in fishing and the processing of marine products have resulted in high productivity and efficiency. In Haiphong, the widespread application of the innovation of using three layer draw nets, which require only 8 to 10 percent of the investment capital and 15 to 20 percent of the labor required by the old method of mechanized shrimping, has resulted in shrimp catches ranges from 80 to 90 percent as high as those achieved by the old method.

To create stable sources of marine products for exportation, the Marine Products Export Corporation has been and is continuing to work with many localities to plan and invest in the construction of areas raising cultivated shrimp for exportation. Economic ties among the three levels (the sector, the locality and the basic unit) are being established in many areas throughout the country that raise cultivated shrimp for exportation. Under the guideline of the state and the people, the central level and the locality working

together, localities such as Nam Can District in Minh Hai Province, Hau Loc District in Thanh Hoa Province, Dong Thap Province, Ben Tre Province and others are actively participating in this form of economic cooperation. This is an investment guideline that will yield major economic returns, make full use of bodies of water, especially brackish water, and require little foreign currency for the importation of materials but still develop the strengths and tap the experience in raising cultivated marine and special products that many localities have.

If, under this guideline, the state gives attention to making appropriate investments, our country will have from 100,000 to 200,000 hectares under the cultivation of shrimp for exportation within the next several years. With each hectare yielding from 3 to 5 quintals of shrimp, our country's cultivated shrimp export industry will make a significant contribution to generating additional export revenues to support the industrialization of the country.

The results described above, although initial ones, are very important because they mark a new stage of development, have stopped the decline in marine product exports that had been a problem for many years and have brought about positive changes in the exportation of marine products within our country. However, besides the results that have been achieved, the exportation of marine products is still limited in many ways. For the most part, efforts are only being focused on the exportation of shrimp and attention is not being given to developing the potentials that lie in many other exported marine products. The product quality of some units is low at times because their emphasis is upon output. However, most deserving of attention is the fact that some localities and units continue to display a lack of discipline, display localism in their marine product export activities and fail to appropriately respect the centralized and unified management of the central level.

Despite the fact that Council of Ministers' Decision Number 113/HDBT (10 July 1982) stipulates that frozen shrimp and squid and dried shrimp are products that are managed exclusively and exported only by the central level, some localities continue to directly export these products. Several practices must be corrected, such as paying two to three times more than the state directed price when procuring a number of marine products or exchanging goods for marine products at a higher rate of exchange than normal with a view toward attracting goods from other localities and competing on the same foreign market by offering conveniently low prices, thus giving foreign merchants something to use to pressure other export units into lowering their marine product prices. In the procurement of marine products, there are still some cases where, in the name of a cooperative or joint business, money and consumer goods are used to procure marine products or foreign currency earned through the exportation of marine products is used to import goods without being subject to the import management procedures of the state in order to sell these products on the free market and earn income through differences in the prices charged for the same products, thereby disrupting prices on the domestic market and adversely affecting production and the procurement activities of the state.

To continue to correctly implement the new policy on the improvement of the economic management system in the exportation of marine products, the marine products sector must work with the localities and basic production units to continue to make comprehensive improvements to economic management; promote planning, promote the formulation of plans and promote socialist production and business activities within all localities and basic units that produce marine products; closely tie scientific research to production and successfully establish economic ties and cooperation through joint businesses with the localities; reorganize the network of production organizations and the production infrastructure; assign and utilize the corps of cadres, manual workers and civil servants engaged in export activities in a rational and effective manner, etc. On the other hand, determined efforts must be made in the immediate future to eliminate the decentralization and anarchy that characterize methods of operation and eliminate the other negative phenomena that exist.

As regards the rates at which the foreign currency earned through the exportation of marine products are distributed among the central level, the sector, the locality and the basic units, there are still some differences of opinion and additional study must be conducted so that agreement can be reached concerning our position and policy. In our opinion, a comprehensive and practical approach must be taken in order to resolve this issue well: everything we do must be done for the sake of production, for the sake of building the country and the interests of the state, the interests of the collective and the interests of the individual laborer must be balanced.

To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to resolve the following problems: first, the state must soon issue a number of regulations and amend the policy on exported marine products in accordance with the resolution of the 6th Plenum of the 5th Party Central Committee and Political Bureau Resolution 19 NQ/TU dated 17 July 1984 "concerning the economic relations between our country and foreign countries." The state must soon adjust and establish uniform marine product procurement prices through regulations that apply to each region and to the country as a whole, especially with regard to the system of negotiated prices, in order to put an end to the competition in the procurement of marine products and the sale of marine products between the central level and the localities and among the localities. Specific regulations should be adopted concerning those marine products that are not under the management of the central level in order to encourage their exportation by the localities or exchange consumer goods for these marine products at a higher rate in order to support procurement efforts to centralize these products for exportation. Secondly, current conditions are such that the foreign currency earned in the form of materials and goods for reinvestment in the export fishing industry is being used differently by the various localities. Therefore, of the 70 percent of the foreign currency that the localities are authorized to use when they complete their export plans, we suggest that the state establish a uniform regulation allowing the localities to use 20 percent in any way they desire while requiring that the remaining 50 percent be invested in the development of the export fishing industry. The 90 percent of the foreign currency that localities have the authority to use when they exceed their plan quotas should also be distributed at appropriate rates. Only in this way can the conditions needed for production to develop be

established. Thirdly, to create the conditions for plans on the exportation of marine products to be met, the state must adopt a specific policy concerning capital investments or permit the Marine Products Export Corporation to invest a portion of its profits for the purpose of more vigorously promoting the production of cultivated shrimp for exportation and establish widespread economic ties and joint businesses with localities to unify and centralize the exportation and importation of marine products throughout the country. Fourthly, the state should soon promulgate a law on the protection of marine product resources, one that puts an end to indiscriminate fishing practices, such as the use of explosives, taking pregnant shrimp, baby shrimp and so forth, and prohibit foreigners from illegally entering the territorial waters of Vietnam to fish or procure marine products.

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## EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON ESTABLISHING THE SOCIALIST WAY OF LIFE IN VIETNAM TODAY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 69-78, 82

[Text] Nong Quoc Chan:

(...)Superstition is a type of negative phenomena within social life. It is manifested in many areas, from the way many people think to their daily habits. Corrupt customs, the offering of sacrifices, fortune telling, phrenology and so forth, which had virtually disappeared following the victory of the August Revolution and during the years of the wars against France and the United State, have now re-emerged and are being practiced in a shocking manner at one place or another.

(...)How can we eradicate superstitious phenomena?

In everyday life, every superstitious thought and action is contrary to the socialist way of life. However, some types of superstitious phenomena arise among enlightened, educated persons; some are the result of blind fanaticism. Anyone who possesses knowledge, be it deep or shallow, broad or narrow, can quote folk proverbs and sayings, can quote from a wide number of ancient and modern books of both the East and the West to defend their world view and philosophy of life. For example, "astrology" was not the invention of illiterate persons but literate persons. Recently, in a number of forums, the "theory of astrology" has been presented complete with illustrations for the purpose of broadening the knowledge of persons engaged in cultural and scientific research. These "educational activities" usually produce nothing that is beneficial to the socialist way of life; to the contrary, the persons to whom this theory is presented come away even more undecided about the negative phenomena they see around them in society!

Subjected to talk about spirits, both evil and good, about good luck, about good days and bad days, the persons who go "to learn and gain an understanding," either intentionally or unintentionally, awaken within themselves old-fashioned, blind and mystical ways of thinking, of viewing life that the Chinese "created" and described on many pages in their ancient book "Devotee of the Way."



It is not our thinking that everything in the life of society and the life of man develops smoothly without complication.

The struggle to resolve the question of "who triumphs over whom" that exists during the period of transition to socialism is more than just a complex struggle that occurs within each person, within each family, along each street, within each village and so forth in our country. This struggle is a sharp struggle throughout the world.

In our efforts to establish the socialist way of life in our country, we cannot permanently coexist with the views concerning lifestyle, way of life and raison d'etre that the bourgeoisie, imperialists and international reactionaries are sowing in our country from every direction every hour of every day.

Regularly holding many scientific symposiums is one of the forms of struggle and persuasion that can be employed to gradually clarify the questions concerning society's way of life that we face today.

The socialist social system demands that each person obey the Constitution, obey the law. Law enforcement agencies cannot tolerate violations of the law, regardless of who commits them. Why are persons permitted to pay taxes so that they can do business in votive paper? Why do we allow the suspicion that a murderer will become "a ghost in the form of a chicken" or "zombie" to deter us from punishing him?

In keeping with the latest directive from the Party Secretariat on "strengthening the leadership of the campaign to establish the new lifestyle, eradicate corrupt practices and superstitions, abolish social ills and sweeping away the reactionary, decadent culture" and the Council of Ministers' resolution on cultural and information work in the years ahead, the people of the ethnic minorities and the revolutionary armed forces are currently conducting a campaign to establish the socialist way of life and lifestyle. Many progressive persons, many progressive units are appearing through the various productive labor movements; through the battles being fought against the enemy aggressors; through the campaign to establish the practices of the new way of life in weddings, funerals, the celebration of death anniversaries and summer festivals; through the movement to build families of the new culture; through the efforts to establish an orderly and sanitary way of life at public places; and through efforts to teach the new aesthetics, teach the new, socialist ethics.

We must confirm the existence of new factors that arise, must develop upon new factors.

We must wage a continuous struggle to prevent and eradicate negative phenomena within society...

Bui Van Nguyen:

(...)In the view of Marxism-Leninism, before we carry on the old traditions of the nation, we must analyze them to determine which aspects we should carry

on, which we should reject and to which degree and under which guidelines the aspects that we select should be carried on. The remnants of the backward and conservative thinking of the old society surely must be eradicated; however, the traditions of humanism and patriotism should not be carried on without giving them any thought, should not be carried on as a matter of dogma, rather, we must be selective with regard to which aspects of these traditions we choose to carry on because the humanism and patriotism and the old society, although they did embody factors that were national and democratic, still could not embody the factors of the proletariat and the scientific proletarian international spirit that exists today.

It is regrettable that the limiting aspects, even some of the ugly remnants, of the feudal mode of production still have not been completely eradicated and are, at one place or another, still causing definite harm and having a rather large impact upon the strides being made by the new life, by the new way of life. Backward and conservative thinking, jealousy and selfishness, even the cruelty and barbarity of the old society still exist today but in a different form, in the modern guise of Western capitalism. They infiltrate our country from overseas from many different channels, through cultural exchanges and trade and sometimes make our already complicated life even more so. As a result, we must remain exceedingly calm and steadfast in order to protect the purity of the new culture and establish the new, socialist way of life by clearly distinguishing between truth and danger, between goodness and cruelty, between that which is aesthetic and that which is offensive.

Of course, our socialist way of life today must, on the basis of carrying on the beautiful aspects of the old society, also develop upon these beautiful aspects, such as love for our fellow man, patriotism, the love expressed in every aspect of family life and life within the school and public office, out in society... The past also holds experiences of value to us today concerning the awareness with which one lives his life, such as family and social discipline, the need for everyone to fulfill his function regardless of his station in life and the need for everyone to set a good example in his station because, if he does not, he will set a precedent for the next person who will assume his position to act improperly. Our ancestors learned by experience that "if superiors are not forthright, subordinates easily become confused" and adopted the slogans "diligent, frugal, honest and just," "impartial and unbiased" to educate everyone in society. President Ho also repeated these slogans but gave them an entirely new meaning. This is the method of "learning from the past" that he taught us to apply. Regardless of the time, persons who possess high ability and sterling qualities do not allow themselves to be corrupted by riches or status. Money is a necessity of life and, because it is, it is also valuable. However, love and devotion toward one another are much more precious. Proverbs tell us: "Compared to the gold of that which is right, money is a clay brick" and "if we forsake that which is right for gold, when the gold is gone, that which is right will still await us." How do we tell whether a person cherishes that which is right more than gold or, conversely, cherishes gold more than that which is right? This is a distinction that we must make because the beauty of a beautiful life lives in the depth of love and devotion, not in the deceptive glitter of riches. And how do we learn to make this distinction? It is through being challenged that we learn everything. "Only in the face of a howling wind do we learn how

strong a pine tree is; only over a hot fire do we learn the purity of gold"(proverb).

From living a life of love and devotion comes a beautiful family life, a beautiful social life. When socialist ethics become the way of life of one father to the next, one son to the next, one teacher to the next, one student to the next, one superior to the next and one subordinate to the next, society will move forward in an orderly fashion. When old traditions are gleaned and developed upon, their inherent beauty is multiplied many many times. But, once created, we must do more than sit back and admire this beauty, we must constantly seek to perfect it. And, we must live with an eye toward the future. But can the beauty that we know today become the fine traditions of our future generations? This is a question that each of us must ask, that each of us must answer because it is we who are the masters of the present and because we provide for the future by training the young generation, training those who will follow in our footsteps, to be the masters of the country, the masters of the world. In his "Testament," President Ho Chi Minh gave us this important piece of advice: "Training the revolutionary generations of the future is a very important and very necessary task."

The young generation, a generation filled with dynamism and vitality, is a precious asset of the nation. We must train them, must create the conditions they need to look far ahead, to look around themselves far and wide and, instead of wasting this most precious springtime of their lives, dedicate their energies to study, work and combat, to becoming good citizens and soldiers of the country, to working hard to train and improve themselves in the image of famous persons of the world.

The young generation must learn to adopt the new way of life, the socialist way of life, the "one for all" way of life, must learn to value the energy they possess as well as their time and the time of others so that they are used to build a better material and spiritual civilization for the fatherland and help to build a better civilization for all mankind.

Dang Thanh Le:

(...)Proletarian consciousness has an impact upon the thinking of man and gives rise to a new concept, a new requirement concerning friendship. This impact has brought about a new concept, a new awareness and, moreover, is becoming a mandate of the heart, a psychological factor of our times. To be genuine, to be beautiful, a person must work and fight for the interests of the collective, the interests of the country and the socialist system. Among both men and women, there is this growing psychological demand of those whom they love.

This demand of our times is one that applies to both men and women. However, our emphasis here is upon this demand as viewed from the standpoint of the woman because women easily find themselves sliding backwards or standing still in their jobs due to the petty bourgeois thinking of maintaining the status quo, of individualism or the vestiges of feudalism (the giving, unselfish wife, the selfish, indifferent husband). The woman's pursuit of her ambitions in the "vigor of youth" gradually wanes. This phenomenon is, from the

standpoint of society, a mistake; however, from the standpoint of fulfillment of the individual, it can affect the happiness of the family, affect feelings of love because the concept of traditional roles has changed. In feudal times, the man sought in the wife someone who would manage the household, someone who would keep house. The wife's dream was for a husband who would distinguish himself in his career. To govern and rule were honors reserved solely for men. Today, however, the social emancipation of women has led to a change in the position of women within the family. The value of the woman has risen in the eyes of society, the family and her husband as a result of the impact which the work she performs has upon the country. Even though the degree to which husbands are aware and progressive in their outlook varies, giving this respect to wives has become a requirement of husbands. This trend is becoming a psychological factor of our times. It is not solely a matter of enlightened reason, but is also a mandate of the heart. Therefore, examined only from the standpoint of her personal happiness, a woman who rejects the continual development of her political qualities, cultural standards, professional qualifications and so forth and the cultivation of her socialist ideals destroys, through her own actions, a relationship of fundamental significance and might even destroy her relationship with those she loves and affect their personal happiness. The continuous development of the spiritual, intellectual, ethical and emotional lives of each member of the family lays the foundation for solid bonds of love among them, for maintaining and enhancing family happiness.

It thus follows from this that all members of the family have the obligation of concerning themselves with the family's spiritual life, in general, and with the specific contributions made to society by each member in the spirit of socialist equality, democracy and unselfishness.

This is equality and unselfishness of the socialist style because the people of today view the progress of others, and themselves as well, in a way that is different from the traditional unselfishness which demanded the virtue of sacrifice on the part of the wife, sacrifice that was onesided, was not reciprocated.

This style, however, does not equate to averagism. Each person's job position and the amount of time spent in intense work by each person differ. We are not trying to say that the wife must contribute precisely the same amount as the husband. The consequences of the old social systems, the psychological and physiological traits of the sexes...have led to the following result: generally speaking, the contributions made by women (in certain comparable situations) are not yet entirely equal to those made by men. However, we do assert that throughout their lives, every member of the family (including the wife, the mother) has the obligation and right to contribute to society in every way possible.

To insure that the members of the family contribute to society, the family as a whole must concern itself with the progress of each and every member, must share together in the work of organizing family life, with each member contributing to the best of his or her ability and as time allows (without

inequality, but without averagism, either). This is work for which no one single person can claim credit, it is the routine, detailed and complicated work of everyday life.

The responsibility that they share in common for organizing family life is a matter of principle of many different dimensions facing wife and husband, parents and children.

The conscious participation by the husband in the responsibility of managing and organizing family life is a new style, a new revolutionary factor in the life that wife and husband share in common. It is manifested in socialist democracy, equality and unselfishness within the new family. Society both requires and creates the conditions for each citizen to make worthy contributions to the common revolutionary undertaking of the country. Value standards concerning the traditional roles that people play have changed. Every member of the family must concern themselves with supporting the development and progress of the other members of the family in this regard. This is a viewpoint, a matter of awareness as well as something that must be given concrete, constant expression everyday in the interpersonal relations that exist within the family.

Because these relations are communal relations, there are relations and contacts among the members of the family themselves as well as between the family community and the other types of communities, that is, neighbors, friends and the collective. These relations and contacts must be viewed and explained from the point of view that they exist for the sake of the development of production, for the sake of the interests of all society. It has come time to face the problems of organizing daily activities and relations (in terms of both what they entail and when they take place). In concept, we feel that there is a need for close, deep and meaningful relations among these communities. We do not endorse a lifestyle of withdrawing within the shell of isolated and selfish bourgeois and petty bourgeois family life. However, this trend described above could be countered by a trend toward feudal nepotism, paternalism...in the form of involved rights and rituals, even corrupt practices.

What we need to do is establish a style of relations with friends, family and the collective that is socialist in nature through which we can improve our own spiritual and emotional lives without impeding creative labor or affecting the work of our friends and neighbors...

Bui Ngoc Trinh:

(...)Whereas during the first years following liberation, the wholesome thinking and way of life of the revolution brought by our cadres and soldier from the resistance war bases, from the North fell like a "bright ray of truth across the hearts" of some youths in the zone once occupied by the enemy, during the very same years and months, the erroneous views and thoughts embodied in the theory of existentialism, the theory of convergence...having infiltrated our country via many different channels, muddled the thinking of more than a few young intellectuals in the North in the way that "a multitude of theories only serves to breed confusion." In particular, the fast,

pleasure-seeking lifestyle, the lifestyle of letting yourself go and defying the rules of society which, in previous years, had corrupted more than a few youths in the South, spread like an epidemic, inflicting direct harm upon a considerable number of youths in the North.

We do not deny the fact that following reunification, as a result of the cultural intercourse between the country's two zones being expanded and becoming direct, a number of progressive aspects of the makeup and dress, of the spirit in which occupations are approached among some youths in the South have had a good influence upon the youths of the North. However, that bourgeois views and ideas and the bourgeois way of life have weakened the confidence in the lofty ideals of socialism and aroused desires for material conveniences, for money, and a willingness to do anything to get money...among some youths in the North (including some who bore arms in the fight against the United States, the fight to liberate the South) are also facts, facts that attest to the terrible harm caused to youths by the remnants of the neo-colonialist culture. This is not groundless conjecture nor are these facts only borne out by sociological studies, rather, they have been confirmed by personal reflections and confessions contained within diaries and letters to relatives written by youths who were born and grew up in the North but have come under the harmful influence of the remnants of the neo-colonialist culture and fallen into a life of wrong-doing over the past several years.

There is another aspect to this that we want to stress. It is that, with the rapid development of the information revolution and the broad international exchanges that exist today, the imperialists, in a very artful and tireless fashion, have been propagandizing bourgeois thinking and the bourgeois way of life with a view toward "destroying" the consciousness and way of life of the youths of the socialist countries. Bourgeois thinking and the bourgeois way of life that the imperialists are spewing forth and the thinking, way of life and culture of the neo-colonialism that the U.S. imperialists sowed in the South, although they differ slightly in degree and form of expression due to the different specific circumstances that exist at each place and time, are identical from the standpoint of being reactionary in character and counter-revolutionary in purpose. Therefore, both of these ways of thinking, regardless of their origin, pose an extreme danger to youths.

Whereas prior to 30 April 1975, they made a strong impact upon the youths in the South through their aggression and the young generation in the North was virtually "immune," since liberation day, the youths of the entire country have been brought face to face with the remnants of the neo-colonialist culture and had to contend with the diverse and complicated, unseen and sophisticated attacks by bourgeois thinking and the bourgeois way of life, which have infiltrated our country by many different channels and from many different directions. Today, in contrast to the past, when the youths of our country's two zones had no direct way to exchange thoughts or take from one another's way of life, an erroneous ideological view, a piece of pornography or a vulgar fashion that infiltrates the South on one day can appear in the North on the very next day and vice versa. This tells us that the complete collapse of the Americans and the puppets did not stop the remnants of their thinking and way of life from infiltrating our youths. To the contrary, every hour of every day, besides the poisons left "in place" as a result of the



rampant infiltration that occurred in past years, they are constantly injecting new poisons into our country. Therefore, the urgent issue we face in establishing the socialist way of life is the need to stop and eradicate the influence of bourgeois thinking and the bourgeois way of life among youths...

Le Viet Thu:

(...)The way of life practiced at public places is the face of a society's life and reflects the level of civilization of the citizens of the society.

Life in public places reflects many aspects of the situation surrounding the essential needs of society and how well social welfare capabilities are meeting these needs. It reflects the degree to which the consciousness of society's citizens has been raised. Examined a little more closely, life in public can be seen as a form of self-management by the masses involving some factors of collective ownership--be they conscious or totally unconscious--without which life in public would quickly collapse. By examining the way of life practiced in public, one can evaluate the ability of society, of the state to give direction to and manage life in public places.

The way of life practiced at public places, like a clear, detailed and colorful picture, reveals much about the values in the life of society.

On arriving in another country, foreign visitors never miss an opportunity to go to public places to make contact with and observe the people. Here, they can gather the latest and perhaps the most reliable information about society, about its culture as well as many other aspects of life. The way of life practiced at public places is a mirror of society, of the nation, of the times.

Ordinarily, the character of the way of life practiced at public places is two-sided and, depending upon the time and place, one side or the other has more or less of an impact.

The negative side:

--The disorder and "commotion" resulting from the complex human relations within a "crowd."

--The frequent display of irresponsible behavior and attitudes and the fact that "no one feels responsible for public property."

--The danger of unexpected events quickly occurring, events that are difficult to anticipate and difficult to prevent.

--The rapid spread and development, at an exponential rate, of things undesirable, of rumors and fabrications and the favorable environment provided for the spread of epidemics.

--Public places are also places at which undesirable elements, hooligans and persons who earn their livings illegally mix among the crowds and do things dishonest.

Children and teenagers like very much to go to public places. There, their curiosity is satisfied and they have greater freedom to be mischievous but their mischievous nature leads to games that are unintentionally very dangerous. Left unsupervised by their families, many youngsters "roam about" playing pranks with their friends and are easily led astray by bad examples.

In ancient society, the masses in the countryside held many unwholesome attitudes about public places. The sayings "good at home, wild at the market," "a worker at home, a bum in public"...give us a good indication of the negative phenomena that originated at public places.

The positive side:

Life at public places reflects many new needs that arise and society's ability to meet these needs. These needs are satisfied by the broad masses on a large scale and regular basis. Public life is also a measurement of the level of development of production forces, people's tastes and the degree of social cohesion in the relations among persons. Once these needs are being properly met, they lead to new needs. This is the process by which the vitality of society is stimulated.

--Life at public places reflects the democratic relations that exist within a developing society. Through it, we see that the masses are no longer shackled and bound by the traditional relations of family, patriarch, church, guild, political faction...and want to mix with one another in broader social relations that afford greater freedom and equality.

--In life at public places, within the context of citizen standards having developed, each individual can bring to public life another beautiful example of our way of life (a different style of dress, a different social etiquette, a different style of speech and a different way of interacting with others that are creative in nature). The possibilities are truly without limit. Every person can be an example. Everyone can learn something useful from others and, in this way, improve a few aspects of their own character...

--In life at public places, there is also the potential for a precious quality that we need very much to be developed. Many sociological forecasts have shown, once a wholesome lifestyle has been established, persons are drawn in their life in public toward charitable and philanthropic deeds, toward a style of behavior that is polite, generous and gracious. It is also under such circumstances that persons have warm feelings about their surroundings and live in harmony and magnanimity. This environment suppresses those things that are ugly and cruel, it controls and pushes them away.

Therefore, if we eradicate the negative phenomena at public places and bring life at public places within the orb of a civilized way of life, we will unleash a very large force supporting society's new way of life. This is also

where we should begin when considering the matter of campaigns to establish a civilized way of life at public places...

Vu Ngoc Lan:

(...)In our country today, in the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism, what is reasonable consumption, which needs are real and appropriate and how do we avoid trends that are foreign to us in the field of consumption? Our party has stated: "Although the standard of living of our country's working people is still low, it must be understood that we are consuming far more than we produce. This is unacceptable. We must live in a manner that is consistent with the results of our labor and not consume more than the level of production permits."(1)

(...)Today, the phenomenon of "consuming far more than we produce" is still widely evident on different scales and among different portions of the population, different strata of society and, in some respects, shows signs of increasing. Excessive eating and heavy drinking made to look "innocent" and refined, an emphasis upon material consumption only and so forth are rather widespread, especially among youths. Many persons consider consumption to be an end in and of itself and spend money excessively to satisfy their desires. The odd and ugly styles of consumption found in the South during the U.S.-puppet period have not stopped. One rather widespread attitude is the virtual worshipping of consumer goods from the capitalist countries. From their undergarments to outer clothing, from the barrettes in their hair to their socks and shoes, some persons only wear products that bear the "mark" of capitalist countries or bourgeois societies, such as the United States, Canada, France and Hong Kong. Many persons only smoke Marlboro cigarettes or only like the fragrance of Dove, Camay or Lux soap. In the rural areas of our country, there is also a need to direct consumption, to educate the people about consumption. Many families, bent on keeping up with the construction of two story homes, promptly add another story to their houses and do everything and anything they can to prepare living quarters for their children to use in the years ahead. More than a few spend thousands and tens of thousands of dong on tea cupboards, carved ebony beds and "grandfather" clocks but are unwilling to dig a well or build a bathhouse. Many persons have spacious homes and much expensive furniture but no blankets or mosquito netting to give themselves a decent life or everyone in the household uses the same face cloth, etc. Feasts, banquets, receptions and the use of public funds to buy gifts and so forth are also very widespread at many agencies, enterprises, factories, cooperatives, etc. To "review work," "celebrate achievements," "celebrate the completion of the plan" and so forth endless meetings are held and, whenever a meeting is held, food is served. As a result, people now say in jest: "We'll go to any meeting being held..."

(...)We must work hard to implement the fundamental law of socialism, the law of "satisfying the rising material and cultural needs of all society better with each passing day." Our party and state have attached very much importance to meeting the needs for food, clothing, shelter, transportation, education, health care, cultural and spiritual activities, physical conditioning, relaxation, recreation and entertainment of the working people. Socialist consumption is a factor of socio-economic progress. The development

of needs is a moving force behind the development of production and gives rise to the emergence of higher needs. However, under socialism, consumption is not an objective in and of itself. Socialist consumption is economical consumption, is opposed to ostentatiousness, extravagance and waste. We must produce very many consumer goods of increasingly high quality, goods that are increasingly attractive in their form, shape and color, goods that meet the rising consumer needs and aesthetic needs of the working people. At the same time, each of us must adjust our consumption, must make an impact upon the consumption process so that it develops in the correct direction and in a manner consistent with the realities of Vietnam. We must not only endeavor to satisfy material needs, but also the cultural and spiritual needs of each and every person. The purposes of developing and meeting the cultural and spiritual needs of man are to bring about the constant development and improvement of man, encourage man to aspire to lofty ideals and bring him abreast of the times. The worth of persons is measured by the cultural and spiritual needs that they demand be satisfied, by the ideals to which they aspire, not by material gratification.

The imperialists and international reactionaries are conducting sabotage against us in many fields, especially within the fields of consumption and society's way of life. They are very sensitive to the tastes of youths and steer these tastes in unwholesome directions to their own benefit. The pragmatic way of life and the thinking of always being in search of more money, of more material goods are making very strong inroads in our country through many different channels. Therefore, under socialism, consumption absolutely must be prepared and guided. The establishment of the socialist way of life will help to train producers of material and spiritual wealth and also train persons in how to properly consume the wealth that is produced.

Hong Chuong:

During the past 2 days of working, our conference has discussed in rather deep detail many issues concerning the socialist way of life in Vietnam in the current stage of the revolution:

1. To begin with, all participants in this discussion have given their attention to distinguishing among and defining the concepts of way of life, habits of life, mode of life, standard of living... These concepts are very closely related but are not precisely the same in meaning, consequently, they cannot be used interchangeably. For example, of the two concepts "way of life" and "habits of life," the concept "way of life" is more general in nature. "Habits of life" only denotes specific aspects of a way of life that have become routine, have become deeply ingrained in everyday life, that is, denotes things that have become established practice, have become stable. However, we have not delved too deeply into this area from an academic standpoint nor have we become involved in giving everything a name.

2. A way of life is defined by the character of a class. Every society has its own way of life. Feudal society practiced the feudal way of life. Capitalist society practices the capitalist way of life. Socialist society practices the socialist way of life. However, not every social system has but one way of life--the way of life of the ruling class--rather, many other ways

of life can also exist within it. These ways of life are different. They are sometimes even opposed to one another and engaged in bitter struggle.

In the present stage of transition to socialism, we are establishing the socialist way of life. However, besides the socialist way of life there also exist remnants of the feudal way of life and the capitalist way of life. These ways of life are locked in bitter struggle with the socialist way of life every hour of every day. And, we have succeeded in influencing to some degree, in winning a considerable number of the masses. As a result, one issue facing the working class and its vanguard party is to not relax their efforts in the struggle between the "two paths" concerning the matter of society's way of life. We must concern ourselves every hour of every day with establishing our socialist way of life.

3. Immediately after the victory of the August Revolution, President Ho Chi Minh appealed for the establishment of the "new life." The essence of the "new life" is the fundamentals of the socialist way of life that we are establishing.

In the spring of 1975, when our fatherland was reunified and the entire country began the advance toward socialism, we immediately turned our attention and efforts to establishing the socialist way of life nationwide. Many important achievements have been recorded in this area. However, due to many different causes, both objective and subjective, especially as a result of lax economic as well as cultural-social management, many negative phenomena have arisen within our society during the past several years and many changes deserving of concern are occurring in our way of life, as pointed out in resolutions and directives of the party concerning this issue.

This situation demands that we be more concerned with this matter, that we take more positive and urgent steps to establish the socialist way of life.

4. Our efforts to establish a socialist way of life attest to the facts that persons who live the socialist way of life are persons who possess lofty ideals, persons who think correctly and possess beautiful feelings, persons who possess fine qualities and ethics, are intelligence and can be tough but still appreciate beauty. They bring consciousness and zeal to their work and work in a disciplined, technical, creative and highly productive manner. They combine socialist patriotism and the pure proletarian international spirit as one and are ready to fight and fight well to defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. They possess a deep love of the working people, unite with and help one another, respect reason, live in a wholesome and frugal way...

Not one aspect of the above mentioned fundamentals of the socialist way of life can be given light attention. However, in this initial stage of the period of transition, our emphasis must be upon work, collective ownership, reason and love.

Establishing the socialist way of life is an important part of the ideological and cultural revolution to mold the new, socialist man. This process is governed by laws of its own and all participants in this discussion have attempted to define these laws.

The realities surrounding our efforts to establish the socialist way of life also show the advantages we have and the difficulties we face in this work, especially at present, in view of the fact that the enemy is waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage against our country. Our conference has given much attention to the current struggle between "the two paths" over the issue of society's way of life.

5. The presentations made at this conference have truly been rich and varied. While we are in agreement concerning fundamental viewpoints and outlook, there are still some disagreements among us concerning specific aspects of this issue. This is normal. We will continue to study the matters involved more deeply, especially such matters as the specific elements of the socialist way of life in Vietnam in the current stage of the revolution, the measures that must be taken to make the socialist way of life universal within our society, the laws by which this way of life is formed, etc. And, in the immediate future, we will explain and organize the successful implementation of the directive issued by the Party Secretariat on 25 October 1984 on intensifying the campaign to establish the new way of life, eradicate corrupt practices and superstitions, abolish social ills and sweep the reactionary, decadent culture from our country.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 5th Congress of the Party, TAP CHI CONG SAN, No 4-1982, p 47.

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## IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES: THE SECRET OF MONEY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 79-82

[Article by Chinh Tam]

[Text] Since ancient times, a rather large number of philosophers, writers and poets have spoken and written about money. Some have sung the praises of money, calling it the "lord of all," the "fountain of fame," the "umbrella for a rainy day" and the "scale of justice." Others have denounced and condemned money, saying that money is "the tool of the cunning," that money "possesses magical power," that money is the cause of countless horrible crimes, that money is "a shameless harlot"!

Today, in our society, we also see more than a few phenomena that reflect the attitude of living life solely for money, of spending one's time chasing after money. In the eyes of some, money is still "the genie, the Buddha," a "good luck charm," a "god"(!).

What gives money this powerful hold on people?

In "Das Kapital," by researching the process of the birth and development of the various forms of value embodied within the relationship among commodity values, Marx discovered the origin and essence of money, discovered the secret of money and stripped away the veil of mysticism and deception that still surrounded money. According to Marx, money is an inevitable product of commodity production. It is a special commodity created as the means by which the value of other commodities is expressed. Originally, the function of money was solely to measure value, to support commodity trade. However, with the development of production, money gradually became recognized by society as a means of circulation and then as a means of accumulation and a means of payment.

With the arrival of capitalism and in the hands of capitalists, money became a means by which the capitalist amassed wealth, that is, became capital. It played the decisive role in producing profits for them. These profits, at first small, grew ever larger. With each T-H-T' cycle, their money grew, grew like the wind. T' became larger than T, T" became larger than T'... As a result, money was respected and valued by those who owned it and this feeling of respect and value subsequently became passion and then intense passion over

money. Money became the "favorite child," the idol of the capitalists. They fell on their knees in worship and became its slave. They pursued money like a hunting dog in pursuit of its prey. They were prepared to send heads rolling or charge cut throat prices to raise their profits by a few percentage points.

In this way, the power of money grew as capitalism developed. Everything in society became something that could be bought and sold, became a commodity. Marx wrote: "Circulation has become the huge funnel of society into which each and every thing is sucked to re-emerge in the form of money."<sup>(1)</sup> The desire, the craving for money steadily increase and know no limits. Originally only a measurement of general value used in circulation, in the economic field, money has infiltrated and attacked other fields as well, including ethics and feelings. It undermines all social relations and pierces family relations. It submerges each principle and feeling of man in icy cold water and causes people to live and treat one another with the cool indifference of "a callous demand for immediate payment." It turns everything upside down: good becomes bad, right becomes wrong ("every man has his price"). Those who have money have everything ("money can even buy immortality"). To have money is to have an automobile, a big house, a beautiful wife, obedient children and the respect of others. Money has become the standard by which social position and social worth are measured, even in the eyes of justice ("the rich are above the law"). It turns good people into bad, law-abiding persons into thieves, hooligans, prostitutes and "pimps." It corrupts man, it makes many people immoral.

However, are these sins of money itself? If we take a close look at a piece of money, we see that it is what it has always been. It is nothing more than a thin piece of paper or a simple piece of nickel or aluminum. It is inanimate. Has it ever grown horns or fangs? "Value bears no inscription to tell you its worth."<sup>(2)</sup> When it first appeared as well as throughout the long course of history, money was and has always been only a means by which the value of commodities is expressed. Its role has never been more than as a means of circulation, a means of accumulation and a means of payment. What made it something mystical, made it an idol was capitalism, under which capitalists, for the sake of maximum profit, revere and idolize money. Capitalist production relations have turned money into a tool of exploitation and oppression, turned people with money into people with authority and power.

Within capitalist society, man is the slave of money. Conversely, within socialist society, man is the master of money.

Under socialism, because commodity production still exists, the use of money is still necessary. Money is still an important means for calculating the expenditure of labor in production and still important as a means of circulation. Without money, we cannot buy or sell, cannot trade commodities with one another, cannot maintain normal life. However, compared to capitalist commodity production, the ways that money is used and spent under socialism are fundamentally different. Money is not capital, is not a form of expression of exploitative relations, rather, it is a tool used by the proletarian dictatorship state to support the development of the national economy and improve the standard of living of all the people. Impersonal,

hostile relations based on vulgar considerations over money between one person and another give way under socialism to relations of comradeship and fraternity, to respect for human dignity, to relations that reflect the very best of man.

Yet, in our society today, there are still persons who worship money, who venerate money no less than the persons in capitalist society do. They, too, have a desire to amass money and live their lives in pursuit of it. They, too, do things that strip them of their dignity to gain wealth, to support their selfish lives. For money, some persons have flung themselves into a life of doing things illegal to earn their living, into selling contraband and making defective and fake goods. For money, some persons have joined the bourgeoisie and dishonest merchants who have evaded re-education and steal goods from the state to support them in their efforts. They "collude" and "conspire" with one another, band together and employ every ruse and tactic imaginable to drain off wealth from the state and collective, to deceive honest, law-abiding persons. These persons, too, live by the guideline "do anything for money." Where is their conscience, their honor, their sense of responsibility? They have none! To them, all that matters is money.

Sadly, this mercenary way of life, this mercenary way of thinking is spreading to some persons who are in the early years of their youth. Although they were born and have grown up under the new system, some youths are starting to learn, are imitating the selfish, lowly way of life of the professional "black marketer." They, too, are becoming involved in deals, in gambling and are also bent on earning money by illegitimate means so that they can have a good time and "drink it up."

That money blinds the bourgeoisie and dishonest merchant and seduces those who are lacking in self-awareness is known; but, it is also blinding more than a few persons within our revolutionary ranks, is pushing its way into and causing trouble within some agencies and public offices. Here and there, we see citizens go to a certain agency or public office and be unable to complete their work because they had no money for a bribe. To obtain a signature needed for a child to attend school, you must bring "a little something" with you. To have someone's name added to census management papers, to request a job transfer, you must pay a bribe. Even among agencies and enterprises, it is necessary to "grease palms," to pay a "kick back" otherwise the work drags on and results become difficult to achieve. Some cadres in positions of authority who control supplies, goods and equipment have become authoritarian and let it be known that they want money. Although they do not openly state "give me 300 ounces of gold and I'll see that it is done" as was the practice in bygone days, they do, by one method or another, subtly "suggest" to the other party what they want, either directly or through an intermediary acting as a "decoy." And, here and there we also find persons whose relations with and treatment of one another are not based on feelings, on duty, but purely on material gain, on money.

The negative phenomena described above absolutely are not endemic to socialism. During the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism, a stage in which the purist form of socialism does not yet exist and the factors of capitalism have yet to be completely eliminated, the existence of

negative phenomena is understandable. The struggle against them is closely tied to the struggle for the victory of the socialist way of life. The corrupt practices of the old system are still infiltrating and sabotaging the new society. The stench of the rotting corpse of the old system still poisons the pure, clean atmosphere of our society.

However, we should not think that these negative phenomena are nothing more than the remnants of the old way of life, of the old system or that they exist only because class enemies and enemies of the nation are looking for every way to attack us, to attack our way of life. Let us ask ourselves these questions: if we had already established a correct way of life, a beautiful way of life and had been waging a relentless struggle against all negative and hostile phenomena, could the old way of life maintain a foothold within our society? Could money subvert the fine customs and morals of our people?

Each person's attitude toward money reflects his philosophy of life. It is clear that a bitter struggle is taking place over the issue of money between the two ideologies, the two ways of life. The persons who firmly adheres to the working class stand and practices the revolutionary philosophy of life has the correct attitude toward money. The person who worships money, who spends his time chasing after money, who does anything to get money is a person who does not want to work, who only wants to exploit others, imitate others, have a good time and pursue the extravagant way of life of the bourgeoisie.

Some persons maintain that it is impossible to establish the new way of life, the beautiful way of life when we are encountering as many economic difficulties and difficulties in everyday life that we are today. This is incorrect. As followers of materialism, we do not agree that a certain economic base must exist before a certain spiritual life can be established; on the other hand, we must realize that spiritual life is not solely dependent upon material life and that it is even more necessary to give attention to our spiritual life, to establishing a pure and wholesome way of life when we are encountering many difficulties in our material life. Have we not triumphed over fierce enemies even while facing acute difficulties in our material life? In ancient times, did not our people endure many difficulties, endure much suffering and countless privations but never once lose their gallant, noble character and manner, never once lose the perfect respect for honor of the Vietnamese? "Things spiritual are more important than things material," "a greeting is worth more than a hearty meal" and "poor but honest" are principles of the Vietnamese, principles that tell us not to do things that are foolish, that strip us of our dignity because we are poor. Saying that one's low standard of living has made him a slave of the material, made him venerate money is simply specious reasoning, simply something said in defense of actions that are wrong, are unethical.

In summary, money holds no secret, holds no frightful power. It remains what it always has been, merely a tool, a means of supporting the production and life of man. The problem lies only in the attitude that each of us has toward it. To crave money, to chase after money so hard that one no longer thinks clearly and does things that are heartless, are unethical is the attitude of an exploiter, of someone who is backward. To allow money to obsess us, to make us so depraved that even our soul is rotten and we lose all willpower is

the attitude of the weak, of those who have no character. Only the attitude of treating money correctly and using it in a scientific manner in exact accordance with its nature and role is the attitude of thinking persons, persons of conscience, honorable persons. Only this is the attitude of persons who are the masters of themselves.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx: "Das Kapital," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1973, Book 1, Volume 1, p 250.
2. Ibid., p 144.

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CSO: 4210/8

DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE  
FATHERLAND

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 pp 83-88

[Article by Minh Nghia]

[Text] Sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacred issues to every nation. National borders are the embodiment of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Consequently, all international laws and customs recognize national borders as "sacred and inviolable" and permit no country to violate the national border of another.

History placed the country of Vietnam beside China, a country for which the past several thousand years have been a process of subjugation, annexation and expansion: in the 3rd century B.C., the territory of the House of Zhou, the nation of the Han as it existed then, measured only about 320,000 square kilometers, or roughly the size of present day Vietnam. In the middle of the 10th century, the House of Tang, which ruled the Central Plains (between Hoang Ha and Truong Giang [Vietnamese transliteration]), subjugated the following countries one after another: Hunan, Sichuan, Hebei, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangxi and Guangdong to restore and expand the Song Empire. By the end of the 18th century, the country of China had grown to 9.6 million square kilometers, and, within it, hundreds of kingdoms had been eliminated and dozens of nations had been wiped out.

Due to these geographical and political factors, the history of the nation of Vietnam has, of necessity, been a process of waging an extremely tenacious, intelligent, brave and determined fight, a very difficult and hard fight, to maintain the survival of the country and nation, to defend our borders. Through the course of this fight, the historic border between Vietnam and China was formed, a border that has remained virtually stable for the past 1,000 years. Issue number 38 dated 29 October 1964 of GEOGRAPHER published by the Office of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. Department of State acknowledged: "In 939, following more than 10 centuries of domination, Annam threw off the yoke of Chinese domination and established the Kingdom of Dai Co Viet... This new country defended its independence...and a border nearly the same as today's border apparently existed between the two countries."

At the end of the 19th century, in the face of the war of aggression unleashed



by the French imperialists, the weak and cowardly House of Nguyen, unable to mobilize the forces of the nation to defend the fatherland, requested assistance from our neighbors to the north. In the autumn of 1882, with traditional expansionist designs, the Imperial Court of the House Qing sent several hundred thousand troops into the northern portion of our country with the intention, as revealed in a secret report to the emperor by Zhangqiu Qing, chief of Truc Le [Vietnamese transliteration] Province and former chief of the two Guang Provinces, Guangxi and Guangdong, of: "Using the pretext of coming to fight the enemy to take occupation of the highland provinces, wait for the situation to change and then occupy the northern provinces of the Red River Delta."

After occupying the provinces of Cao Bang, Lang Son, Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen, Bac Ninh and Bac Giang, the House of Qing, on three different occasions, proposed sharing Annam with France, with a view toward taking advantage of a "once in 1,000 years" opportunity to make a major change in the border that had formed between the two countries through the course of history.

Beginning in 1882, the process of alternate political negotiations and military clashes between the Imperial Court of the House of Qing and the French imperialists and the process of negotiating the demarcation of the border on land and at sea became difficult and complex. They resulted in the signing of two Franco-Qing Conventions in 1887 and 1895. In 1897, following the emplacement of markers, the border between Vietnam and China had a solid legal basis and was clearly marked on land by 341 border markers stretching over 1,463 kilometers. Because the French imperialists were very interested in the southern China market and also had the desire to quickly establish a stable Vietnam-China border so that they could consolidate their rule, France made a number of important concessions regarding the territory of Vietnam: it conceded to the House of Qing the entire Giang Binh-Bac Long area and the districts of Ba Trang and Kien Duyen in Quang Ninh Province, Tu Long in Ha Tuyen Province and Deo Luong in Cao Bang Province, a total of roughly 1,600 square kilometers.

From the time that the marking of the border was completed until 1949, the feudal and bourgeois governments of China, employing a wide variety of tactics, illegally encroached upon and occupied an additional 60 places within the territory of Vietnam.

The border between Vietnam and China next became an issue following the victory of our resistance against France and the total liberation of North Vietnam. In a pure spirit of internationalism and with the desire to end the historical enmity between our two nations and open a new chapter in the history of the relations between our two neighboring, socialist countries, we advocated the establishment of a border of permanent peace and friendship between Vietnam and China. In 1957, although it realized that Vietnam would lose land under the Franco-Qing Conventions, our Party Central Committee officially proposed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that the two sides recognize and respect the historical border. In early 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China officially announced its acceptance of this proposal. One would have thought that the

border issue between the two countries had been resolved in principle and that the historic border defined by the Franco-Qing Conventions would be respected. However, precisely the opposite occurred.

#### A. On the Mainland

From 1949 to February, 1979, that is, until just before it openly committed armed aggression against Vietnam, China employed many cunning tactics to encroach upon and occupy territory of Vietnam, such as sending persons across the border to farm and live and then taking occupation of the places inhabited by these people; pushing the border deeper into Vietnamese soil through the construction of friendship projects, etc. For example, they once occupied land by abusing the trust of Vietnamese railroad cadres. In the memorandum acknowledging the completion of repair work on the Yen Vien-Huu Nghi Quan Railroad, despite the fact that they knew that the rail link between the railroads of the two countries had been positioned 300 meters within territory of Vietnam, they deceptively recorded this point as lying along the border and subsequently defending this action by saying: "The railroad of one country cannot lie in territory of another!" By this sleight of hand," they encroached upon and took occupation of a strip of territory in Lang Son Province that runs along the border for 3,100 meters and extends from 100 to 500 meters into Vietnamese soil. In the area of border marker number 23, also in Lang Son Province, they attempted a similar tactic during cooperation between the two sides in the construction of an oil pipeline. And, when Vietnam suggested that the link between the pipelines of the two countries be positioned precisely on the border, they refused and abandoned the project. They also unilaterally constructed projects along the border that encroached upon Vietnamese soil, borrowed land from Vietnam and then turned it into territory of China. For example, at Phia Un in Tra Linh District, Cao Bang Province, they were given permission to use a trail of ours. They subsequently widened this trail to accommodate motor vehicles, erected telephone poles along it and sent in people to live on either side. Then, they demanded that the border there be moved 500 meters into Vietnam, a demand backed by the specious argument: "Were this not Chinese soil, how could China build a road there, install a telephone line and so forth?" They also secretly moved border markers into territory of Vietnam and even took advantage of an occasion they had to print maps for Vietnam to move the border into Vietnam. Once, they printed a map minus two sheets depicting areas along the border and kept the original copies of these two sheets.

As the victories of the Vietnamese revolution increased, the authorities in China instigated an increasing number of border incidents to pressure Vietnam and bring it within their sphere. Along the northern border, they instigated 179 troublesome incidents in 1974, 294 in 1975, 812 in 1976, 813 in 1977 and 2,175 in 1978.

After sending, in a fit of temper, some 600,000 troops to invade Vietnam in a vain attempt to "teach" Vietnam a lesson, to severely punish Vietnam and make Vietnam crawl (as Deng Xiaoping said to Brezezinski in January, 1979) and ultimately suffering tragic defeat and being forced to withdraw, they continued to occupy dozens of hills on the border and along the Vietnamese side of the border and then gradually began using military forces to attack

and occupy many additional hills and clusters of hills all along the border, some lying more than 2,000 meters within our territory, in order to continue to alter the original historical border and control terrain that will prove beneficial to them in every situation.

From the positions they have occupied and with a large force of army units massed along the border creating a posture of constant intimidation, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists have redoubled their efforts to control each section of Vietnamese territory lying along the border. They have been employing a wide variety of activities, such as using fire power to control areas along the border, conducting regular spy and commando operations, instigating acts of banditry, corrupting local cadres and so forth, to impede our people from earning a living, impede us from exercising our right to control and manage our territory. These positions have become bases of China in the wide-ranging war of sabotage being conducted in areas along our country's border. Statements by Chinese prisoners of war concerning the policy of "straddling the border and leveling our defense bases along the border" bear testimony to these systematic crimes being committed with a specific objective in mind by the Chinese authorities.

By brazenly and persistently encroaching upon and controlling territory of Vietnam, the Beijing authorities have violated the most basic principles of international law on territorial sovereignty and the sacred, inviolable nature of national borders. What right does China have to open fire any time it wants on citizens of Vietnam as they travel, earn their livings, study or live on Vietnamese soil, to open fire on Vietnamese border defense soldiers and people's public security forces conducting patrols within Vietnam and constantly make threats to attack and occupy territory of Vietnam!

#### B. In the Gulf of Tonkin

Measuring roughly 130,000 square kilometers, the Gulf of Tonkin, a gulf that lies between the two countries of Vietnam and China, has for generations been closely tied to the lives of the peoples of both countries and does not lie along any international maritime route. The gulf occupies a position of importance, from both an economic and national defense standpoint, in the survival of Vietnam. Practically all wars of aggression against Vietnam since the birth of Christ have involved the use of sea routes through the Gulf of Tonkin.

Article 2 of the 1887 Franco-Qing Convention states: "Paris longitude 105 degrees 43 minutes east (that is, Greenwich longitude 108 degrees 03 minutes 13 seconds east) forms the border."

On the official map appended to the 1887 Convention, which bore the seals and signatures of the representatives of France and the Imperial Court of the House of Qing, the easternmost section of the border between Vietnam and China was drawn as a red line along the above mentioned longitude and the following notation was made: "Paris longitude 105 degrees 43 minutes, which passes to the east of the tip of Tra Co Island, forms that portion of the border that extends from the final point of the border drawn by the Demarcation Commission." Thus, the border between the two countries in the gulf had been

clearly demarcated: to the west of longitude 108 degrees 03 minutes 13 seconds lay Vietnam, to the east lay China.

Later, in a number of official documents concerning relations with Vietnam, such as "The Protocol on Continued Cooperation in the Combined Investigation of the Gulf of Tonkin," "The Stipulations of the Science and Technology Commission of China Concerning the Command of and Communications Among the Ships Investigating the Gulf of Tonkin" and so forth that were drafted by the Chinese side, China also considered longitude 108 degrees 03 minutes 13 seconds as the border within the Gulf of Tonkin.

Foreign countries, in issues relating to the Gulf of Tonkin, have also considered this longitude as marking the border between Vietnam and China within the gulf. For example, on 24 April 1965, the president of the United States, in the order stipulating the combat zone of U.S. forces within the Gulf of Tonkin, cited longitude 108 degrees 15 minutes east as the border. On the map of the Gulf of Tonkin petroleum and natural gas exploration proposal delivered to us by Japan, Japan also considered the border within the Gulf of Tonkin as being longitude 108 degrees east.

On the basis of the historical and legal facts presented above, our view is: the Gulf of Tonkin is a common historical gulf(1) of the two countries. The border between the two countries within the gulf was defined in the 1887 Franco-Qing Convention.

However, in January, 1974, China officially declared that "longitude 108 degrees east is definitely not the territorial sea border between the two countries" and prevented us from developing natural resources within Vietnam's portion of the gulf, saying that "the Gulf of Tonkin is the common gulf of the two countries; Vietnam's action of bringing in a third country to conduct explorations is not in the interests of the economic development, security and national defense of the two countries." China suggested that "the two sides temporarily refrain from conducting exploration in the area encompassed by longitude 107 degrees-108 degrees and latitude 18 degrees-20 degrees" (that is, an area lying to the west of the established border under the sovereignty of Vietnam measuring roughly 24,000 square kilometers).

At present, on the map of tracts open for leasing bids by foreign oil corporations for seismic exploration, China has drawn the border in the Gulf of Tonkin as they define it and considers the matter closed. On the other hand, they routinely send armed ships to operate illegally in the waters west of longitude 108 degrees 03 minutes 13 seconds east and many other places within the waters of our country in the Gulf of Tonkin, thereby blatantly violating the sovereignty of Vietnam.

#### C. Concerning the Paracel and Spratly Islands

The Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands have been a part of the territory of Vietnam for many years. Due to the large size of the region encompassed by these islands and their geographical position in the South China Sea, these two island groups are very important to our country, both from the standpoint of security and national defense and the standpoint of the economy. Long ago,

the Vietnam state was the true owner of these two archipelagos before they were the territory of any country and has exercised true sovereignty over these two archipelagos for several hundred years in succession. This is a clear fact, a fact that can be fully proven and verified, a fact that cannot be argued.

However, the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, is an immediate target in the global strategy of Beijing. In addition to their desire to become a continental superpower, Beijing also harbors the grand ambition of rapidly extending its control into the seas as well, beginning by controlling the South China Sea, a sea tied to the destiny of the countries of Southeast Asia.

The "People's Republic of China Province Map" published in 1950 contains an inset map of all three archipelagos in the South China Sea, which they call East Islands, West Islands (that is, the Paracel Islands) and South Islands (that is, the Spratly Islands), and one submerged bar that does not meet the standards of an island, which they call Middle Island. Thus, according to this map, the border of the People's Republic of China embraces the entire South China Sea. As drawn, this border extends all the way from latitude 4 degrees north some 2,000 kilometers from Hainan Island and only about 40 kilometers from the territory of Malaysia and 70 to 80 kilometers from the coastlines of the Philippines and Vietnam. By drawing its border in this way, China seeks to control about 80 percent of the South China Sea. It must also be stated again that previous materials published in China, such as the "Map of the Empire" published in 1905 and republished in 1910, still clearly depict the southernmost part in China as being Hainan Island and that the "Atlas of China" published in 1906 states: the southernmost points in China are Chau Nhay and Quynh Chau [Vietnamese phonetics](that is, Hainan) on latitude 18 degrees 13 minutes north.

On 15 August 1951, Chou Enlai declared that all four of the archipelagos in the South China Sea had long been territory of China. In 1956, China sent troops to occupy the eastern portion of the Paracel Islands as soon as the French army withdrew and before the army of the Saigon puppet government could take its place.

In January 1974, after joining hands with the U.S. imperialists and taking advantage of the Vietnamese people's preoccupation with the resistance against the United States for national salvation, China mobilized a large contingent of naval and air forces to attack and occupy the remaining western portion of the Paracel Islands, thereby completing their invasion and occupation of these islands.

Since then, China has made every effort to consolidate its hold on the Paracel Islands, turning them into a base to threaten our country from the sea, using them as a foundation for demands on areas in the sea and continental shelf within this region and, on this basis, eventually achieving their aim of gaining exclusive control of the South China Sea. The Beijing authorities have used every tool, every opportunity, every international forum to "legitimatize" their act of aggression against the Paracel Islands while preparing public opinion and laying the "legal groundwork" for achieving their



ambition of invading and occupying the Spratly Islands. In 1977, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua arrogantly declared: "When the opportunity arises for us to reclaim the whole of the South Islands (that is, the Spratly Islands), there will be no need for negotiations."

Thus, because of the expansionist and hegemonist ambitions of the reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles, numerous difficult and sharp border-territorial issues exist between ourselves and China today. Concerning these issues, the expansionist and hegemonist policy has been a consistent policy implemented through diverse activities suited to the state of political relations between our country during each period of time. These activities of theirs along the Vietnam-China border, together with their acts of war and acts of sabotage along the Cambodia-Thailand border, along the Lao-China border and their cunning diplomatic activities in the International arena, are designed to undermine the solidarity of the three countries of Indochina, encircle and isolate Vietnam and impede the work of peaceful construction within Vietnam in a vain attempt to make Vietnam "bleed," to weaken and cripple Vietnam and, in this way, achieve their strategic goal of forcing Vietnam to yield to China. Through their wide-ranging war of sabotage and their war of encroachment and occupation, they hope to achieve a strategic objective without paying much of a price, without causing complex political, military or diplomatic problems for China; on the other hand, they also hope to make direct preparations and create favorable conditions for launching a large-scale war of aggression whenever they can or must.

In the face of these schemes and actions of the reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles, the struggle to defend the fatherland, to defend the frontier of our country, a country that lies in the main path of expansion by Beijing on both the mainland and at sea, is, of necessity, a long and complex struggle. Words of counsel spoken by persons in our ancient past, such as "let us defend the country well"(the Testament of Ly Anh Tong), "we must have a plan for defending the border"(the advice of Le Loi) and "we of today must defend the land of the Imperial Court, it is our duty to preserve our territorial integrity, protect the peaceful and quiet lives of the people, fight against and break the back of attacks by those who look down on our country"(advice of Le Thanh Tong) complement the teaching of the great President Ho Chi Minh: "The Hung Kings performed the service of building the country, we must work together to defend it."

In the past, during more than 10 centuries of Chinese domination, our forefathers, relying upon the nation's strong vitality, thwarted the scheme of the "Celestial Court" to assimilate us, retained the nation's character and eventually restored our national independence. This was followed by impressive feats of arms in the fight against the aggression and expansionism of the Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, thereby preventing them from sweeping down into Southeast Asia. Today, under the leadership of their vanguard party, the Vietnamese, with the experience gained in winning victory over many types of imperialism, including the ringleader of imperialism, U.S. imperialism, and supported by the strength of our times, the strength of the special solidarity among Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and the strength of their friendship and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, surely will thwart every scheme and action of



the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and firmly maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the fatherland.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. An historical gulf is a gulf which, due to its geographical characteristics and close relationship to the economy, security and national defense of one or several nations over the long course of history is governed by a separate statute different from ordinary gulfs and is under the complete sovereignty of one or several of these nations.

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#### COVER PAGES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 85 inside front cover, inside back cover, outside back cover

[Text] Inside Front Cover

"Our country is still poor. To achieve prosperity, we must practice self-reliance and work diligently. We must work hard in production. Working is our sacred obligation, is our source of life, is our source of happiness.

(...)

Everyone must consciously maintain labor discipline."

Ho Chi Minh  
("Molding the Men and Women of  
Socialism")

#### Inside Back Cover

Grain output (in paddy equivalent, millions of tons)

1976: 13.5

1980: 14.4

1983: 17.0

1984: 17.6

Hogs (millions)(2 months or older)


1976: 9.2

1980: 10.0

1983: 11.2

1984: 11.8

(1) CHỈ SỐ PHÁT TRIỂN  
(2) GIÁ TRỊ TỔNG SẢN LƯỢNG NÔNG NGHIỆP  
(tính theo giá cố định 1970)



1. Index of growth
2. Value of total agricultural output (calculated at fixed 1970 prices)
3. Total
4. Crop production
5. Livestock production

Outside Back Cover

Advancing agriculture to large-scale socialist production

[This slogan appears as the caption below a drawing depicting rolling farm fields lying at the foot of a chain of mountains. Standing at the base of the mountains are factories and three equidistant electric power towers. In the foreground of the drawing is a young woman in ethnic dress operating a two-wheeled, belt driven mechanical plow. Crossing from left to right in the center of the drawing are two standard field tractors. Rising from behind the mountains in the background is an atomic symbol representing the sun. The drawing is by Le Thiep.]

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